The German Tribune

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

Hamburg, 29 October 1978
Seventeenth Year - No. 862 - By air

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Economy ready to go – Bundesbank

Frankfurter Rundschau

Let there be no misunderstanding, Bundesbank president Otmar Emminger seemed to say after the last session of the Central Bank Council, watchdog of the Deutschemark.

Credit restrictions did not herald the slightest change in money policy. They were merely imposed to mop up some of the hot money that had flowed into West Germany in recent weeks.

The Frankfurt Bundesbank has obviously learnt its lesson. Once before, in 1975, Frankfurt bankers and Bonn economists abruptly stemmed the tide of cheap and ready money, ending hopes of economic recovery.

The situation is the same today. At last the economy is on the move, according to all five leading economic research institutes.

The economic outlook has not just improved; economic recovery is in full swing. Bonn is to blame for the public's failure to notice the faster pace.

Politicians have been worried that their efforts to boost the economy might flop and decided this time not to overtall their hand.

In the past Bonn has been quick to claim that every little economic swallow heralded a glorious summer. This time they preferred to talk of a slight improvement.

The Opposition could hardly be expected to point out that the economy was in fact making a speedy recovery, so this unaccustomed role has been assumed for once by the usually ultra-cautious Bundesbank.

The Bundesbank has been sounding a confident note from Frankfurt, claiming that "indispensable prerequisites for self-supporting economic growth" now exist.

Since summer business has been so brisk that Herr Emminger expects growth to reach between three-and-a-half and four-and-a-half per cent by mid-1979.

That would be a substantial improvement on the first half of this year, which, with a growth rate of 2.8 per cent, fell well below the Bonn Economic Affairs Ministry target of three-and-a-half per cent for the year.

If the Bundesbank and economic research institute forecasts prove accurate, the 1978 target, long since written off, would appear more realistic.

The five economic research institutes say economic growth this yer could reach three-and-a-half per cent, increasing to four per cent next year.

Since last June economic indicators have persistently pointed up. The construction industry and motor manufacturers are not alone in reporting good business.

Nearly all major industries report higher orders and have been able to boost output. High growth rates are noted by all except down-in-the-dumps industries such as mining, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and one or two others.

More and more companies in mechanical engineering, the crucial capital investment sector, are reporting better business.

This is a particularly encouraging sign. Experience has shown that one of the first signs of economic recovery is orders of equipment to manufacture consumer goods.

Has this sudden improvement since the summer recess been genuine? Time and the updating of economic statistics alone will tell.

But the trend is so widely based and prospects are so promising that "cautious optimism" is for once an understatement from Bonn.

Economic recovery programmes involving DM35,000m in extra government spending finally seem to have achieved results.

The state has chosen to forgo tax revenue. Inflation is down. Over the past six months both sides of industry have netted higher profits and take-home pay than for years.

Yet another economic booster programme, number 13, is in the pipeline. It includes the abolition of payroll tax, a controversial move in recent months.

If it all happens, as indeed it may, with no further serious trouble in foreign trade and domestic cost increases kept to within reasonable limits, it will still be a long time before the country's longest post-war economic crisis can be forgotten.

Growth rates will still stop far short of ending unemployment, still hovering short of a million.

During the crisis 1,600,000 jobs have been abolished, mostly by rationalisation, while high birthrate years will continue to leave school and compete for jobs until 1985.

At the best of times we shall have to think in terms of redistributing work among a larger work force. *Fritz Kral*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 October 1978)

Welcome for Scheel

Prime Minister Robert Muldoon welcomes President Walter Scheel and his wife, Mildred, on their arrival at Christchurch airport on an official visit to New Zealand. (Photo: dpa)

IN THIS ISSUE

High noon compromise over Namibia poll

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The Pretoria compromise reads as though Windhoek, capital of the future state of Namibia, were on a trade route somewhere in the Far East, not in South-West Africa.

Both sides evidently feel they have struck a bargain without losing face, and now two elections are to be held instead of one.

South Africa and the democratic parties of the South-West are to stick to their deadlines: elections by the end of the year and independence from 1 January.

But the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, meeting in Windhoek's old German gymnasium, spent months drafting a constitution which will now not come into full force.

The five Western members of the UN Security Council persuaded Pretoria to abide by the Security Council resolution and hold a second election next year.

This second election is to be held under UN supervision and will be contested by the Marxist-orientated Swapo.

It may be a clumsy compromise but it might just work, depending on the commonsense and goodwill of the parties concerned.

South Africa certainly seems to have made some concessions, and since Pretoria has gradually abandoned many past ideas and viewpoints on South-West Africa, the inflexible Boers can fairly be said to have gone a long way towards meeting UN demands.

Racial discrimination by law no longer exists in South-West. Pass laws and the notorious Immorality Act have been abolished.

The decision to grant the former mandated territory full independence and allow elections on the one man one vote principle has been a another leap forward.

Other moves have merely been attempts to manipulate developments and maintain the existing power structure. But UN-supervised elections are now to be held and Swapo will be given its chance.

Does Swapo stand much of a chance in Namibia itself? What does South Africa stand to win or lose? It is hard to say, but a look at the figures may help.

Namibia is roughly three-and-a-half

Continued on page 2

■ FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Church sends out papal shock waves

Twice in few week the Roman Catholic Church has shown that it still has the power to electrify the world.

John Paul I entered the first conclave an unknown cardinal and emerged for just over a month as a Pope who disarmed the world with his smile.

His sudden death prompted fresh speculation over his likely successor. Few pundits would have banked on the new Pope being a non-Italian.

But if he were, they would have expected him to be a cardinal from an unobjectionable country such as Holland or Austria, perhaps even South America, where two-third of the world's Catholics live.

No-one expected the conclave to elect a cardinal from an East bloc country.

The new Pope was a rank outsider, and anything but an unproblematic cardinal from a free country previously tipped as a likely candidate.

John Paul II is a Pole who was archbishop of Cracow, a diocese which includes Auschwitz, and in Poland he had always been just outside the limelight occupied by Cardinal Wyszinski, the imperious Polish primate of world repute.

What is so sensational about his election is not that the conclave's choice fell on a cardinal no-one had previously considered.

In gaining a two-thirds majority Cardinal Wojtyla must have been backed by Italians and conservatives, representatives of the restless Third World and of the rich, anti-Communist West.

The majority preferred a Pole to an Italian, and the first Pope since the 16th century not to come from Italy comes from, of all places, a Communist country.

The Italians gave him a spontaneous hand but the country that has really been overwhelmed is Catholic Poland, where his election is sure to strengthen the church.

But will it help embattled Christians in Czechoslovakia and the Balkan states? We shall see soon enough. The election of an East bloc cardinal as Pope may have been wildly acclaimed, but it will only have a shock-wave effect where the authorities have no option but to tolerate it.

In choosing the name John Paul II the new Pope has signalled his intention of carrying on the work of his predecessors.

His life story has earned him a fund of international goodwill. He is the son of a poor Polish workman, and as a young priest pastoral duties took him to the Polish mining communities in France and Belgium.

He was sentenced to hard labour by the Nazis in occupied Poland and ended the war in an annexe of Dachau concentration camp.

Yet he was one of the foremost advocates of forgiveness and reconciliation between Poles and Germans.

In addition to personal experience of suffering and injustice, John Paul II comes from an embattled church, which cannot fail to have repercussions for the Roman Catholic Church as a whole.

He is unlikely to take a soft line. John Paul II can be expected to be firm on doctrine and tradition. Having suffered and fought for his church, he is keenly aware of the value of freedom.

So he is sure to be regarded as a provocation by both the East, where freedom is denied, and the West, where awareness of freedom's worth has atrophied.

It is too early to forecast the new Pope's *Ostpolitik* but he is sure to combine anti-Communism with a fair amount of criticism of capitalism.

Many feel the election of the first non-Italian Pope for 500 years marks a turning point. But does it really mean more than the opening of door? Next time, maybe, a non-European might be elected Pope.

Yet a turning point it nonetheless is. For the first time in centuries of Popes from the free world a representative of an embattled church has taken charge.

Even unbelievers cannot fail to be impressed by a Pope who endured hardship, taunts and privation, even imprisonment in a concentration camp, for the sake of his beliefs.

Bernd Nellessen

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 18 October 1978)

EEC has growing pains over three new nembers

Before long the EEC Nine will be Twelve. Since the restoration of democracy in Greece and Portugal in 1974 and Spain in 1975-77, Common Market leaders have agreed that the three must be allowed to join the European Community.

Greece, Portugal and Spain are semi-developed countries on the southern fringe of Europe, but for political reasons they could not be refused admission.

Greece applied to join the EEC in 1975 and Spain and Portugal followed last year,

It has always been obvious that southward expansion of the EEC would prove much more difficult than the 1973 northward growth to include Britain, Ireland and Denmark,

But the deeper government specialists and Brussels Eurocrats go into the details, the more formidable the difficulties appear.

In a number of EEC countries farmers and small businessmen, even the workers, seem most uneasy at the prospect.

French Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac and the French Communists, strange bedfellows, are both openly opposed to Common Market membership for Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Yet Greece's negotiations with the Nine, in progress since 1976, will soon reach the stage when the last major decisions on transitional arrangements can be made.

Negotiations with Portugal have just officially begun.

The Nine are nonetheless clearly reluctant. President Giscard d'Estaing of France has written to the other eight heads of government asking how EEC institutions are going to function when membership is increased to a dozen.

The Common Market Commission in Brussels, the European parliament, and other EEC bodies would grow too large and unwieldy, and this is by no means the only problem.

M. Giscard d'Estaing is particularly worried about voting in the Council of Ministers. Britain, France and Denmark are already at loggerheads over this issue in connection with Greece's membership bid.

The French proposal is to appoint three EEC elder statesmen to draft solutions. Paris is at pains to point out that the proposal is not a pretext to postpone Greek accession to the Common Market, but this would seem to be the result.

A number of EEC governments are not enthusiastic about commissioning yet another memorandum on how to get better and faster decisions from the Council of Ministers.

British, French and Danish parliamentarians jealously guard their privileges, so in practice the proposals would get nowhere.

The Tindemans Report, dating back to 1975, says everything that needs to be said on the subject.

Bonn and Whitehall are not keen on the French and Italian calls for farm policy changes by the Nine as a condition of Greek membership.

Bonn, as current chairman of the Council of Ministers, would like to reach a compromise.

One can understand Chancellor Schmidt wanting firstly to gain acceptance of the proposed Eruopean Monetary System by the end of the year, regardless of resistance both inside and outside the EEC.

There are limits to the work even a head of government can put in. But a great deal is at stake politically if the Greek membership talks fail to end satisfactory by the end of the year.

In the first half of 1979 France will chair the Council of Ministers, and France will find it much harder to accelerate the proceedings because French political parties are opposed to EEC expansion,

It would make sense to increase by one the number of representatives on EEC bodies when Greece joins, which, given the need for ratification, will not be until 1981 in any case.

The more difficult institutional issues facing a 12-member EEC can be settled afterwards. Spain and Portugal will not become Common Market members until 1985 or so, by which time there will be a second directly-elected European Parliament.

The consequences in all three would-be member-countries of the Common Market could prove most unpleasant if a decision on Greece's membership bid were postponed now.

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 October 1978)

Continued from page 1

Namibia deal

times the size of West Germany but has a population of only 880,000, about half of whom have the vote.

The largest ethnic group are the 400,000 Ovambos in the north; followed by roughly 100,000 whites, 30 per cent of whom are of German origin.

Then come about 100,000 Hottentots and 50,000 Hereros, 50,000 Kavangos and 50,000 half-castes.

Between densely-population Ovamboland in the north and the developed, in parts mainly white, areas in the centre and south there is some of the most inhospitable desert in the world.

It remains to be seen whether Swapo can exercise enough attraction or wield enough power in the north, but even if it gains some support among the Ovambos, it will find it difficult to gain ground in the south by guerrilla tactics.

To wage bush warfare you need bush; not hundreds of miles of treeless waste, and urban terror can be kept in check provided it lacks public backing.

This accounts for the tactics of Swapo extremist leader Sam Nujoma. What he wants is power, not elections. But since no-one seems willing to hand it to him on a plate, he is playing along half-heartedly.

In all likelihood the extremist wing of Swapo will lose next year's elections. So South Africa can look forward to developments in a calmer frame of mind.

There are two possibilities, both of which have their advantages from the South African viewpoint:

– The elections may lead to the formation of a multiracial government in Windhoek, in which case Pretoria need have no misgivings about continuing to cooperate with Namibia.

A compromise might then be reached on Walvis Bay, a South African enclave which includes the South-West's only deep-water port and substantial uranium fields.

– Swapo may take power, in which case South Africa can still retreat into the laager. There would then be a mass exodus of the white middle class with its technological and organisational skills.

The whites would head for South Africa, which would benefit from their abilities.

The West is pursuing a risky policy but the prospects are good. An example would be set if it were to succeed in bringing about a peaceful transition.

The transition from a multiracial population under authoritarian white rule to a democratically fair and economically efficient system of voluntary cooperation would be seen to be feasible.

Rhodesia would stand to benefit, as would socialist Angola and Mozambique. Western ties with these countries have not been broken off, nor have their ties with the West.

If, on the other hand, the venture proves a failure, crisis will be imminent, and not only in southern Africa.

Hans Heigert

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 October 1978)

The German Tribune

Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke; Editor-in-Chief: Otto Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Peter Temple. Distribution Manager: Georgine von Platen. Advertising Manager: Peter Boeckmann.

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH. 23 Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 76. Tel. 22 85 1. Telex: 02 14733. Bonn bureau: 65 Adenauerallee. 53 Bonn. Tel.: 21 90 00. Telex: 08 86398.

Advertising rates list No. 13. Annual subscription DM 35.

Printed by Krögers Buch- und Verlagsdruckerei, Hamburg-Blankenese. Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.

All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE reprints are published in cooperation with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are complete translations of the original text, in no way abridged nor editorially redrafted. THE GERMAN TRIBUNE also publishes quarterly supplements featuring articles selected from German periodicals.

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Trying to find lessons of Hesse and Bavaria

DIE ZEIT

Mid-term election results in Bavaria and Hesse signally failed to provide politicians in Bonn and Munich with any clear guide to what step to take next.

Voters remained true to their parties, swings one way or the other were negligible to the point of apathy, and trends were hard to find.

The ball was lobbed firmly back to the politicians, as though voters were telling them to get on with it and come up with a few bright ideas.

This is certainly true of the Bonn Opposition; the Christian Democrats can by no means be sure of regaining power in 1980. But the Social and Free Democrats are not without problems either.

In Bavaria the Christian Social Union, led by Franz Josef Strauss, kept its absolute majority and came within three per cent of its record poll of 62 per cent.

Yet the signs were nowhere near as favourable for the CSU as last time around. And the Christian Democrats fared extremely well in Hesse too.

The Opposition vote, seen as a number rather than a percentage, has stabilised. The two sides are roughly equal in strength and minor fluctuations are enough to decide the general election outcome.

The Social and Free Democrats can naturally breathe a sigh of relief. The SPD has regained ground and the FDP is back in the running after a disastrous showing at the polls in Hamburg and Lower Saxony last June.

But the long-term outcome is undecided. In Hesse coalition voters helped the Free Democrats to clear the five-per-cent hurdle. In Bavaria they were an option for voters who fancied neither the all-powerful CSU nor the local SPD, not a particularly attractive alternative.

It many by wring to say that votes were only lent to the Free Democrats, but it would be equally mistaken to talk of consolidation of the FDP vote.

The Liberals are not in a position on their own to reshape the entire party-political landscape. Their leeway is strictly limited.

Next spring Land assembly elections are to be held simultaneously in Schleswig-Holstein and the Rhineland-Palatinate. In Schleswig-Holstein, the FDP has resolved to go into coalition with the SPD if the opportunity arises. In the Rhineland-Palatinate, the Free Democrats are not committing themselves.

This disparity could well prove as disastrous as the FDP's split personality last June, when the Free Democrats were in coalition with the Social Democrats in Hamburg and with the Christian Democrats in nieghbouring Lower Saxony.

In both Länder they failed to poll the necessary five per cent and were unceremoniously turfed out of the state assemblies.

Bavaria, where the FDP similarly refused to commit itself on a potential coalition partner, proved nothing. Given the overwhelming CSU majority, coalition commitments were wishful thinking.

In the Rhineland-Palatinate, home state of CDU leader Helmut Kohl, the Christian Democrats may have an absolute majority, but the margin is narrower and the Free Democrats are more likely to be asked to state their preference.

The Christian Democrats can certainly not expect to regain power in 1980 in coalition with the FDP. They will have to make up their minds: either launch Herr Strauss's Bavarian CSU as a national party or realign their entire policy.

There is no point in awaiting the outcome of the next election. The signs are that they will prove no more conclusive, and besides, Herr Strauss claims to be unmoved by what he calls percentage point mythology.

The debate on whether or not to launch the CSU as a fourth national party could well harm the Opposition in more ways than one.

They would be ill-advised to hedge their bets and split a little, having decided that a fourth party might not win the extra votes they need.

Let us assume, for instance, that CDU and CSU issue separate election manifestos and refuse to commit themselves on their joint Shadow Chancellor.

The loser in any such arrangement would almost certainly be Herr Kohl, whom the Social and Free Democrats would accuse of wanting to take over as Chancellor yet not even being allowed to lead the Christian Democrats in their general election campaign.

Besides, a vacillating Opposition is doing its prospects in forthcoming Land elections no good. It is merely diverting attention from what ought to be its chief concern: to cast itself in the role of a convincing alternative to the ruling coalition.

This is what the CDU should be concentrating on at its Ludwigshafen party conference, rather than making do with a manifesto that uses generalisations to paper over contradictions and refers to future tasks in euphemisms.

It is high time the Christian Democrats bridged what CDU general secretary Heiner Geissler has termed their credibility gap.

A volte-face is not what is needed. No-one would believe in it, least of all the CDU's own supporters. What the Christian Democrats need is the courage to take a calculated risk.

Individual Christian Democrats are setting an example. They include Frankfurt mayor Walter Wallmann, Stuttgart premier Lothar Späth, West Berlin shadow mayor Richard von Weizsäcker and Hanover Economic Affairs Minister Walter Leisler Kiep.

Were these men clearly to influence the policy of the CDU as a whole, and CDU leader Helmut Kohl to back them against resolute opposition on at least a few controversial issues, a few more voters might yet be persuaded that the Christian Democrats are more liberal in outlook than they have seemed to be for some time.

Much is at stake at the Ludwigshafen CDU conference: the party's future and its forthcoming election prospects. Herr Kohl and his party would be wrong to believe that Herr Strauss's handsome but not overwhelming showing at the Bavarian polls has solved all their problems.

Rolf Zundel

(Die Zeit, 20 October 1978)

Strauss sets sights on big issues

Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss (as he will be from 6 November) plans to have his views heard not only on financial affairs but on other national issues.

He started in the very interview in which he announced this intention.

At least a quarter of the Opposition financial spokesman's time was devoted to Africa, on which he appeared to have detailed knowledge, especially about the Ovambo tribe in Namibia.

Does Herr Strauss really believe that as Bavarian premier he can extend his influence to the conduct of foreign affairs in Bonn?

The constitution allows the Länder no more than participation, or a say, in federal government legislation and administration, no less but no more.

He knows full well that his future activities will be hampered by constitutional contraints the Opposition has already exploited to the limit in the Bundesrat (upper house of the Bonn parliament).

He also appreciates that his CSU party headquarters in Munich is not exactly a hub of world affairs.

The Bavarian leader's claims to political influence still exceed by far the power he commands by virtue of his offices.

The only solution to this contradiction is that he seriously intends to go ahead with what everyone else is talking about and establish his CSU as a national party alongside but in competition with the CDU.

As leader of a national CSU Herr Strauss would indeed be entitled to voice his views on all aspects of politics, and not merely when they affect Bavaria.

As leader of a fourth party he would also no longer need to pay even formal heed to the claims to leadership of CDU leader Helmut Kohl.

Herr Strauss has claimed for the past four years that the Bonn Opposition parties could attract more voters if they were to part company at the polls.

This, he says, is the only way in which the CDU and CSU can possible hope to oust the Social Democrats in Bonn without the support of the Free Democrats.

But what right-wing support can the CSU possibly hope to mobilise that is not already wholeheartedly in favour of the Bonn Opposition?

Helmut Kohl's view, as put by CDU general secretary Heiner Geissler, is more plausible. He says extra voters can only be gained to the left of the CDU by adding a few social and liberal flourishes to attract coalition supporters.

But if the CDU is to move a little further to the left of the political spectrum will it not need a national CSU to ensure right-wing support?

Although this strategic argument sounds convincing it remains a doubtful starter. Who is going to back the fourth party outside Bavaria?

Which leading CDU politician could afford to risk switching allegiance to Herr Strauss?

No matter how the arguments are put, none of them really carries conviction, or proves the need for a fourth party.

Not, that is, unless you happen to be Franz Josef Strauss.

Hans Werner Kettenbach

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 17 October 1978)

Bid to damp fourth party speculation

CDU leader Helmut Kohl thinks the debate in the Bonn Opposition on the need for a fourth party is over now that the Bavarian election campaign has been fought and won.

The fourth party would be a national CSU, the Bonn Opposition party led by Franz Josef Strauss in Bavaria.

Herr Kohl, whose CDU is represented everywhere except in Bavaria, told the CDU executive in Bonn on 16 October, the day after the Bavarian elections, that Christian Democrats must regard the issue as shelved:

They ought not to allow themselves to have the fourth party issue foisted on them by political opponents.

In Munich, CSU general secretary Gerold Tandler said the Bavarian election did not indicate a need for change in CSU policies.

The fourth party was not at issue until after the Schleswig-Holstein elections next spring at the earliest.

CDU and CSU failed to understand why Social and Free Democrats were worried about Opposition unity, which was the "Christian Democrats' supreme good."

SPD leader Willy Brandt said he still expected the CSU to take the plunge as a national party. SPD general secretary Egon Bahr said Helmut Kohl had been given a lesson at the polls in Hesse and Franz Josef Strauss one in Bavaria.

The CSU polled 59.1 per cent in Bavaria, which Herr Strauss saw as a glorious victory. He would be conferring with outgoing Bavarian Prime Minister Alfons Goppel before the end of the week, he said.

Herr Strauss, due to succeed Herr Goppel as Bavarian premier on 6 November, said he would take care and time in appointing his Cabinet.

He did not believe in sweeping changes. It might be advisable in a bankrupt company, but the CSU was doing good business.

The CSU fell three percentage points short of its record performance, faring worst in areas traditionally staunchly CSU.

In the Bavarian Forest area bordering on Czechoslovakia, the CSU polled five per cent less than in 1974, when it improved on its previous showing by three per cent to a high of 68.3 per cent.

In comparison with 1974 the Social Democrats won three more seats to take them to seven, the remainder being elected by proportional representation via the state list.

The closest contest was in Hof-West, where Willi Kaiser (SPD) beat Georg von Waldenfels (CSU) by 191 votes.

The highest margin was in Neumarkt in the Bavarian Forest, where Hans Spitzner of the CSU polled 74.3 per cent of constituency votes and the Social Democratic candidate 18.7 per cent.

(Die Welt, 17 October 1978)

LABOUR

Unemployment drops but debate gets hotter

DIE ZEIT

At the very moment when the unemployment rate in the Federal Republic of Germany is about to drop to an annual average of less than one million for the first time since 1974, the debate on unemployment is becoming hotter than ever.

Accusations are being made that the Federal Labour Office has resorted to illegal means in its stepped-up efforts to find jobs for the unemployed, even if the jobs are changes from previous occupations.

Protests have been coming in furiously against a court ruling that forced an unemployed teacher to temporarily accept a lesser job.

On the collective bargaining front it is becoming increasingly obvious that the next round will see an all-out bid for the 35-hour week.

But the conflict shown by the criticism of the Labour Office's handling of job broking and by the new collective bargaining strategy of the trade unions does not go very deep. It comes down to the fact that both criticism and new strategy are out of keeping with the economic upswing in the offing.

As the economy picks up, so do job opportunities for those willing to work. And this provides a lever to prod those who are unwilling. Moreover, the jobless wanting to work are now less in need of support by a union policy pretending to be able to create new jobs.

The discrepancy disappears completely on digging deeper. Those who consider it intolerable that the Labour Office should demand more vocational and geographic mobility on the part of job-seekers act the way the way they have always acted — along the lines of a chiefly social policy which aims at being charitable.

In the dispute about whether a job is an imposition on an unemployed person they once more attempt to set themselves up as the warm-hearted against the hard-hearted, as *Süddeutsche Zeitung* recently put it.

Those who believe that shorter working hours would considerably increase the number of jobs have remained faithful to their own tenets. They still believe, as they did five or ten years ago, that social problems can best be solved by ever greater demands on the GNP.

The fact that exactly the opposite is true and that it is these very demands which have caused our problems leaves them cold. They view this as a reactionary attitude.

But the labour situation provides ample opportunity to learn from post-war experience.

Firstly: An important reason for the unprecedented economic recovery of the Western half of Germany was this very willingness of millions of job-seekers to work. The highly-qualified technical was grateful for a chance to feed his family by the lowliest of jobs.

Teachers took on jobs in the construction industry, mechanical engineers worked in agriculture and former entrepreneurs started a business in some dilapidated shack with the simplest of equipment.

Working under conditions no-one would like to see again, they created the conditions that would one day enable them to do the job for which they were trained.

Secondly: In the 50s and early 60s, the trade unions' distribution of income policy, in spite of complaints by employers and unaffected by opposition from their own ranks, obtained no more for their members than was feasible in the interests of sustained prosperity.

The number of jobs grew faster than demand. As a result, everybody who wanted to work found a job, and affluence increased steadily.

Thirdly: Gradually, with growing affluence, the efforts that brought this about were forgotten

Granted the growth crisis in the mid-60s was not primarily a consequence of excessive expectations of future national wealth and the attendant demand for its institution, although it had something to do with it.

For the last time (in 1967 and 1968) trade unions and public service organisations temporarily curbed their demands — only to increase them disproportionately in the following years.

They issued drafts against the future that existed only in dreams. Investments had been stagnating since the end of the last decade, while the burdens imposed on business by the social security system grew as rapidly as did the social security payments by the state.

Only due to the passing upswing of the world economy in the early 70s were we able to indulge in the illusion that we would be able to honour the drafts regardless of their amount and without jeopardising employment.

We should know better today because we are now faced with the irritating fact that many businesses are not employing new people even if they sorely need them.

The construction industry especially would rather forgo a new order than hire more labour because it knows that a man once hired cannot be laid off. Not only does the industry have to pay high wages but on top there is also the enormous and rising burden of social security payments.

'Critics,' especially in the trade unions, are not all that wrong in claiming that business refuses to employ.

But they fail to ponder that this refusal is based on economic reasons and that this happens to be part of a society based on freedom of decision.

Nonetheless, the trade unionists have dubbed their present demands and those planned for the winter as an "employment policy".

They are in for a rude awakening: this policy is more likely to strengthen the determination by business to withhold new jobs than to provide them.

It is wrong in the interests of the jobless to oppose the move whereby the unemployed would now have to accept lesser jobs or be expected to move.

The less the Labour Office expects of them the smaller their chances of finding a new job and the greater the reluctance by business (and the working population which has to pay for the unemployed) to bear the manifold burdens of unemployment.

It is also — again in the interests of the jobless — wrong to believe that all that is necessary is to reduce working hours by one-eighth, to 35 a week, in order to create more jobs. Such a policy will be welcomed only by those who have work, while doing nothing for those out of work.

Even if, as Heinz Oskar Vetter, chairman of the German Trade Union Confederation intimated two years ago, lower working hours were to be compensated for by proportionately smaller wages, their effect on employment would still be rather small.

There are too many work processes that cannot be divided up by mathematical formulas.

But now there is no longer any talk of reduced wages, and this makes it even worse for the jobless. They will be faced by refusal on the part of business to employ new staff, an attitude likely to become even stronger.


The disastrous consequences of such a misguided policy will make themselves fully felt in a few years. At the moment the number of those seriously seeking a new job is relatively low — certainly far below the official jobless figure of just under 900,000.

The heavy birthrate years will crowd the labour market in the next few years. In addition, the enlarged European Community will bring hundreds of thousands of southern Europeans seeking work to the Federal Republic of Germany.

By the mid-80s we will need at least two million new jobs if the number of unemployed is not to increase dramatically. But these jobs will not materialise if the course of our employment policy has been charted as wrongly as it appears to be today.

Dieter Piel

(Die Zeit, 20 October 1978)



No hope for some workless says research report

Handelsblatt

Unemployment will remain unsatisfactory in the second half of this year, says the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, in its latest weekly report.

But the annual average of unemployment is likely to drop slightly below the one million mark for the first time since 1975.

It is becoming increasingly clear that it will be almost impossible to find work for certain kinds of job-seekers.

For instance, the number of severely disabled and elderly jobless is increasing and the number of unemployed women has hardly diminished.

According to latest statistics, one in four jobless has been unemployed for more than a year, and 100,000 have been waiting for employment longer than two years.

Having studied the figures for the second quarter of 1978, DIW concludes that the number of jobs has increased only slightly. (20,000 over the same period last year), while short-shift work has diminished.

Employment figures between March and June rose by a mere 10,000, though lay-offs have been slightly overcompensated by new hiring.

The drop in employment involved the entire industry, especially in the basic materials and consumer goods sectors.

Only 3,000 additional workers were employed in the motor industry. There was a positive development, however, in the trades, commerce, transport and the public service.

The number of blue-collar workers fell by 0.6 per cent against 1977 and that of white-collar workers and civil servants rose by 0.5 per cent.

Wages and salaries based on collective bargaining deals rose by 4.9 per cent over last year.

The increase of actual gross earnings amounted to 5.2 per cent per person.

But due to the tax relief that came into effect at the beginning of this year, individual net incomes rose by 6.4 per cent. Deducting an inflation rate of an average of 2.7 per cent, this means an increase of real income by 3.5 per cent.

DIW notes with satisfaction that the productivity increase in the second quarter of 1978 was large enough to considerably reduce costs.

Piece wages in industry were only 3.8 per cent higher than in the same quarter of 1977, and in business as a whole only 2.1 per cent.

(Handelsblatt, 19 October 1978)

ARMED FORCES

MBFR talks turn six – and only the faces change

The faces in Vienna's former royal palace, right next door to the Spanish Riding School, have changed. But the positions of East and West, though slightly modified, are the same, and so are the obstacles, on the long road towards a mutual balanced forces reduction in central Europe (MBFR).

This month opens the sixth year of MBFR talks, the most delicate game of patience in détente policy.

The Nato countries still stick to their demand that troop reductions be carried out within the collective framework of alliances, rather than on the basis of national forces. But in one form or another the West will have to arrive at an understanding with the Warsaw Pact on the approximate extent of the national shares of forces reduction.

If an agreement was reached which, the way things stand at the moment, would entail troop reductions by ten to 15 per cent on both sides, security emphasis in Europe would shift from military defence to political accord.

The position of the Federal Republic of Germany is a telling example: if Nato land forces were to be reduced by 11 per cent (in keeping with the 8 June 1978 proposal of the Warsaw Pact), and if the West German share in the total was to be taken as a yardstick, the army with its present strength of 336,000 men would have to be cut by between 42,000 and 49,000 to 287,000 men.

If this was to be carried out in complete units, it would equal two-and-a-half divisions with 500 to 600 battle tanks, the entire artillery and anti-tank force, all battle vehicles, transportation and all supporting technology.

All Warsaw Pact proposals to date come down to this demand for the withdrawal of larger combat units and thus to a limitation of West German land forces.

Though the Nato countries would not disband German divisions, they would instead have to dissolve a corresponding number of brigades or battalions and thus significantly affect the structure and curtail the combat readiness of the army.

Whether this can be done by "cadreising" a corresponding number of units, or whether reserves will have to be adjusted accordingly and mobilised at regular intervals to preserve the defence potential, would have to be negotiated in Vienna.

In any event, such a reduction in battalions or brigades would create considerable gaps in the Federal Republic of Germany's defence system, and the prerequisite for a forward defence would be weakened still further. As a result, any kind of troop reduction except by reducing men would be detrimental to the West, above all Germany.

The Western delegations have so far avoided being pinned down to national reduction quotas by complete units.

As opposed to the original offer of 1970, they have also not expressly indicated the possibility of reducing armaments. They might have restricted themselves to the general concession to include "only European" troop reductions in a second phase of general forces reductions.

This noncommittal attitude has strengthened the Soviet Union's mistrust of the West's intentions.

The Soviet delegates are pressing for an unequivocal commitment to withdraw complete units with "proportionate equipment" and for what they call "a common basic pattern" of troop reductions with "approximately equal" national quotas in equipment, arms and units.

The Russians hold that not all parties involved should withdraw the same arms, units or equipment to the same extent. But all participants would have to offer "equivalents" for a "balanced compensation".

Though this Soviet attitude has been clear from the very beginning (the first Eastern draft treaty of 8 November 1973) it is now taking on the political shape of a condition.

Soviet diplomacy in Vienna serves a clear goal. It wants to preserve the actual strength relation in favour of the Warsaw Pact. It does not want to permit any interference in Soviet military organisation, and wants to bring about a considerable reduction of the West German land forces.

For the Soviets, the Bundeswehr remains the only truly important Western fighting force. Although the Soviet army group in the GDR, with its 366,000 men, stronger than the West German army by about 30,000 and has about twice as many battle tanks (7,300 against 3,800), overall Soviet land forces in central Europe with their 460,000 men and 9,500 battle tanks are considerably stronger than those of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviets view their German adversary as considerably stronger than it really is — and not only from a historic vantage point — and are motivated by both military and alliance policy reasons.

For them, the Bundeswehr is the actual counterpart of the Soviet army in mutual forces reductions. If the picture of Soviet military might in central Europe is to be retouched, the Soviets argue, then the German army must shrink by exactly as much in men and weapons as the Soviet force. The trouble is the Soviets do not admit their true strength in the GDR.

East European and Soviet diplomats in Vienna have already said that the Soviet Union would accept no exception to their detriment from the rule of alliances as a collective.

This argument is not new. But since it has been put forward so strongly it indicates the main direction of the East bloc's thrust in negotiations: the Western demand for balance is countered by new Eastern demands with an entirely different criterion of balance, that is, what has to be balanced are Soviet and West German troops. This is also to apply to weapons and equipment to be withdrawn.

Naturally, this idea of commensurability is out of keeping with reality, since Soviet troops are superior to German units not only in numbers and armaments — incidentally, this applies to the Warsaw Pact as a whole against Nato — but the units to be withdrawn. According to Western demands, five divisions with 1,700 assault tanks, 68,000 men and assorted equipment could be used elsewhere by the Soviet Union, while Bundeswehr units to be withdrawn would have to be demobilised. And according to Eastern demands, their equipment could neither be passed on nor stored. In other words, this would amount to a partial disarmament.

Last June's proposals by the Warsaw Pact contain some concessions, primarily on the crucial issue of maximum national strengths. But these proposals also envisage upper national limits while demanding that the Soviet army in central Europe be included in collective alliance strengths and collective reductions.

Thus the main Western objective achieving as large a Soviet troop withdrawal as possible would be thwarted. The Soviet army with its armoured potential and its ability to carry out surprise attacks is the greatest threat to Western Europe's security.

Both sides in Vienna are, however, agreed on one point despite general differences: the dispute over troop strengths essentially revolves only around the strength of Soviet forces and their reduction.

Here the positions are still irreconcilable. But no progress is being made because Soviet figures on their troops in central Europe are considerably lower than Western estimates.

It is, however, possible that the breaking down of the figures, which has now begun, will resolve some of the great discrepancies between Western assumptions and Eastern statements on the strength of the Warsaw Pact (Western assumption: 962,000; Eastern contention: 805,000 for land forces).

The Eastern air defence units have already been taken out of the land forces strength, making for a correction by 43,000 men. But even then the difference on the overall strength of land and air personnel remains.

The Warsaw Pact says that its units have not been strengthened as much as Nato assumes and that an "average national personnel strength" should be established to arrive at genuine strengths for each army for the purpose of comparing data. But this will not remove the large discrepancy.

The Polish contention that a considerable part of its armed force in Poland is actually a kind of armed labour force living in barracks will only permit some sort of accord on the strength of Polish troops, but will not reduce the grey zone of undisclosed Soviet troops.

In view of all this, any accords reached can hardly be of practical value for the success of the talks.

The East lists ten such accords, three of which are emphatically denied by the West. As a result, Western delegations to Vienna have steadfastly refused to draw up an interim balance sheet that would include these points. The Eastern list of accords encompasses:

- Parity or equal troop strengths on both sides resulting from reduction.
- Collective reductions and maximum alliance strengths.
- Reduction of land forces only but including air force personnel and related troops in the general personnel strength on both sides to a strength not to be exceeded.
- Reduction in two phases in accordance with two agreements resulting from two negotiations, to start with American-Soviet troop reduction.
- Approximate equality in the type and number of reductions on both sides.
- Undiminished security for all participants as a guiding principle.
- Inclusion of arms and equipment in troop reductions.

The last two points were, in principle, already contained in the 1973 negotiating mandate for the conference.

The assumption of the parity principle by the East can only gain significance if agreement is reached on existing troop strengths and hence on the extent of mutual reduction. This crucial question remains open.

The three points of accord denied by the West but listed by the East are:

- Equality in the kind of reduction for Soviet and American troops by large units (two to three Soviet divisions against two to three US brigades).
- Transfer of this modality of troop reductions from the first to the second phase (with similarity and equality of all national reductions).
- Reductions of all national forces in relation to their share in the alliance forces in that region in personnel and armament, in other words in the overall strength of land forces and their equipment.


The Western delegations stress that they have never agreed to a withdrawal of complete US brigades, a proportionate fixing of national reductions quotas, an inclusion of equipment or a transfer of patterns of any kind.

They point out that these items are fanciful interpretations of Western statements by Eastern conference strategists who would like to create the impression that the contours of an agreement have already been tabled.

But this is not the impression given by Soviet diplomats in Vienna — especially when they say they cannot yet imagine how talks on the number of existing troops could succeed.

Lothar Ruehl

(Die Zeit, 20 October 1978)



(Cartoon: Ironimus/Süddeutsche Zeitung)

■ THE ECONOMY

Foreign unrest makes Bonn look to stockpiling

The Federal Republic of Germany has up to now had few problems with the supply of raw materials from abroad but political instability, especially in Southern Africa, is now causing Bonn to consider establishing stockpiles.

Though raw materials output has frequently been hampered in some countries and regions by prolonged strikes, revolutions and military conflicts, Germany's economy has not yet seen serious bottlenecks. It has merely had to pay more.

Whether this will remain so is doubtful and Bonn is considering stockpiling, with state assistance for important and rare raw materials.

Stockpiles have long existed in other countries, especially the United States and Japan, and even Germany is establishing national reserves of crude oil, coal and uranium for its energy needs.

The idea of extending these stockpiles to certain other raw materials is basically sound. It is obvious that the hoarding and maintenance of reserves calls for considerable state financial subsidies.



But the frequent suggestion that Bundesbank foreign exchange reserves should finance stockpiles and provide relief for the budget must be emphatically rejected.

These proposals have been put forward before, supported by the argument that foreign exchange reserves are old-fashioned savings kept under the Bundesbank mattress and dead capital which could be put to good use.

Those arguing along these lines simply prove that they have no idea of what foreign reserves are and the way in which they accrue.

They are evidently ignorant of the fact that the reserves have accrued primarily because German exporters have exchanged export proceeds in foreign currency at the Bundesbank and because German banks have done the same with foreign cash investments.

This means the Bundesbank has had to spend deutschemarks at the rate foreign currency flowed into the country.

In other words, circulating deutschemarks are the counterweight of foreign exchange reserves and the banks' minimum deposits with the Bundesbank the money with which our economy operates. It is therefore wrong to speak of "dead capital".

But because the Bundesbank had to spend deutschemarks for its foreign exchange reserves, it stands to reason that it can spend foreign currency only if it receives German money in return.

Of course it could be argued that the *Bundesbank should simply grant the government* a deutschemark credit, for which it in turn could obtain the necessary foreign exchange. But the Bundesbank is not permitted to do so.

Germany's Central Bank Act permits only cash credits for a maximum of three months, otherwise prohibiting on principle any Bundesbank credits to public authorities because they would otherwise have a direct access to the money presses.

By the same token, the Bundesbank may not engage in deals with other than banks in the the private sector.

The purpose is to ensure that the Bundesbank's main function of securing monetary stability is not hampered by other transactions.

There are evidently many wrong ideas about the availability of currency reserves.

Granted, the Bundesbank's gold and foreign exchange reserves now stand at an impressive DM90 billion. But it must be taken into account that these reserves have in the past few years been increasingly used to provide monetary and current account assistance to countries with weak currencies and balance of payments problems.

These credits and lines of credit at present tie up about DM30 billion. Another liability of this nature has now come into effect with the Witteveen facility — an international credit fund.

But, above all, Europe's new monetary system, entailing the transfer of 20 per cent of national foreign exchange reserves to a European monetary pool, constitutes a drain.

Adding all this up, we arrive at DM40 billion as freely available foreign exchange reserves. But this amount is in no way too high, considering short-term foreign indebtedness of German business and loans falling due in the near future, all amounting to more than DM50 billion.

Of course, this is offset by foreign liabilities, and there is also little likelihood that all short-term liabilities will be called simultaneously.

Even so, the possibility of a large-scale outflow of foreign exchange cannot be excluded. It is also uncertain whether we shall forever be able to achieve the same high foreign trade surpluses. This, too, could change due to Germany's high production costs.

Considering all this, our foreign exchange reserves must not be channelled from their actual purpose by using them to establish raw materials reserves.

In view of the uncertainty of the future, it is essential that we maintain adequate liquidity reserves: hands off our foreign exchange reserves.

Hans Roeper

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 12 October 1978)

Money markets calm over revaluation

Europe's money markets reacted anything but sharply to the Snake members' *decision* to revalue the deutschemark parity within the Snake.

But no reaction was to be expected. After all, what were the underlying reasons and what has been done?

What happened is this: for two reasons, the deutschemark parity was so high that the currency of Germany's Snake partners dropped to a point where support purchases became necessary. Purchases can only be sustained for a limited time due to the unnecessary liquidity, and hence inflationary tendency, brought about by interventions.

The first reason is common procedure. The Federal Republic of Germany has had a much lower inflation rate than its partners. The revaluation of the deutschemark within the Snake was therefore only a question of time. No matter how quiet things might be on the monetary front, an adjustment within the Snake had to fall due sooner or later. Adjustments have already been made half a dozen times.

The other reason has to do with the new European monetary system. While the *intention is not to imitate* the Snake, some of its basic principles will remain — especially the system of bilaterally calculated parities, and this means the exchange rates of the new partners must be realistic.

Nothing would be more disastrous for an enlarged monetary union than mishaps shortly after its inception. Its credibility, viewed with scepticism anyway, would soon be lost.

Since the French franc will play a major role in the fledgling European monetary system, it will be important to fix its exchange rate against the deutschemark in such a way that parity fluctuations can be warded off.

Thus, the deutschemark revaluation appears to be only a preliminary step.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 October 1978)

Capital flow abroad hits new high

In the first eight months of this year, German capital involvement abroad not only exceeded that of the first eight months last year but, at DM4.5 billion, was far above the DM2.5 billion investment by foreign companies in the Federal Republic, says the monthly report of the Bundesbank.

This development is not new. The change came in 1975, says the bank.

In the previons three years investments by foreign companies in Germany were about DM1 billion higher than this country's capital exports.

But then the flow of capital was reversed and between two and three billion deutschemarks more flowed out than came in.

The investment flow not only indicates economic changes but is also a consequence of changed conditions — and these have altered considerably in the past few years.

The constant appreciation of the deutschemark and increased wages have made German labour costs very much higher on an international scale than they were in the early seventies.

The Bundesbank is certainly right in saying that labour costs are not the only reason for direct investments abroad. But the cost relation has nevertheless acted as a catalyst.

There is, however, more to it: Germany as an industrial site has also become less attractive for foreigners because it is now considerably more expensive for them to buy equities in German companies. On the other hand, the appreciation of the deutschemark has made German involvement abroad cheaper.

Against the dollar, for example, the deutschemark has appreciated by more than 70 per cent since early 1973.

This is one of the main reasons why German companies invest more in the United States than anywhere else.

From 1975 to 1977, German investments in that country alone amounted to DM3.8 billion, compared with only 1.3 billion, in the three preceding years.

The share of investment in the USA of overall direct investments abroad rose from DM11.8 billion to DM27,7 billion.

During the same period net capital imports from the United States were halved to not quite DM2 billion — notwithstanding that the American share in direct investments abroad dropped only from 28.4 to 27 per cent.

If the lamentations of German trade unions are to be believed, it should be relatively easy to figure out when foreign investment in Germany will cease and jobs will be exported only.

Furthermore, complaints about direct investment abroad would only be meaningful if there was an alternative and if we could continue to supply foreign markets as we did in the 60s when the deutschemork exchange rate was below par. That this is no longer possible is shown by the VW plant in the United States.

The appreciation of the deutschemark and rising labour costs — as opposed to direct investments abroad — do hamper exports.

The fact that despite this exports failed to drop in the past few years is also attributable to the profit falls which German business has been prepared to accept. But such diminished profits cannot be sustained *in the long run*.

A considerable *portion* of German investment abroad helps to buttress export. This certainly applies to the enlargement of the marketing and service network. But even investment in the service industry sector, primarily banks and insurance — and their share amounts to 20 per cent — promotes exports.

Moreover, direct investments abroad attract shipments from this country, not only in the development phase but also when component parts have to be bought in Germany.

The proximity to markets also promotes the sale of other parent company products. It must also be borne in mind that some developing countries hamper imports to such an extent that a market can only be held be producing in the country.

But all this does not mean that increased direct investments abroad have no effect at all on exports. Some of the goods manufactured abroad certainly take the place of shipments from this country. The question is whether this would not still be the case if the investors were not German but other foreign companies.

And even if growth of German exports should slow in the long run, such a reduction of trade surpluses in conjunction with capital exports contributes towards a more balanced world economy.

High foreign trade deficits are not only the cause of unrest on foreign exchange markets; they also promote protectionist tendencies — and both are bad for the German economy.

Hans-Jürgen Mahnke

(Die Welt, 18 October 1978)

■ EMPLOYMENT

Study of working women comes up with unexpected results

A five-year study by the Sociological Research Institute, Göttingen, has come up with some startling findings on the attitudes of women towards their work and working conditions.

The study was commissioned by the Rationalisation Committee of German Business and financially supported by the Federal Labour Office and the Bonn Family Affairs Ministry.

Entitled Working Conditions and Work Consciousness of Working Women, its objectives were two-fold: firstly, to provide a balancesheet of typical kinds of women's work in the manufacturing and service sectors, to examine the knowledge and skill demanded, the physical and nervous demands and the scope of action available. Secondly, it wanted to find out the assessment of such work by the women workers themselves.

Not all women interviewed evaluated their work as tersely as the piecework seamstress who, asked whether she was satisfied with her work, replied: "Satisfied indeed. I could not have had it better."

While previous studies were carried out almost exclusively under aspects of family sociology, that is, based on the assumption that the family is the woman's domain and on the resulting family orientation when it comes to deciding whether a woman should work or not, this study concerns itself with the question of how working conditions affect this attitude.

Let it be said from the beginning: There is indeed a family orientation when family obligations conflict with restricting conditions at work — the case with most manual women workers and some white-collar employees.

This group of female workers work primarily for the money. Even so, they are not apathetic towards their work but are marked by an attitude of resignation.

The theory that women generally demand less of their working conditions, thus achieving higher job satisfaction, has largely been disproved by the study.

At the same time it shows that a high degree of personal adaptability, together with skills, variety and scope of decision, are generally approved of by women workers.

The National Federation of Employers Associations, which welcomes the study in principle though differing with it on certain individual findings, complains that it interviewed only 499 women in 13 companies with a disproportionately high number (75 per cent) of blue-collar workers. It is thus not representative of the female labour force — especially since only 32 per cent of women employees are blue-collar workers.

The authors of the study concede this point but say the intensity of the interviews makes the results significant even if they might not be representative.

The authors also stress that it was extremely difficult to gain access to companies. Of the 97 firms approached, only 37 could be thoroughly inspected and only 13 agreed to cooperate. Even in those companies ten per cent of the women chosen to be interviewed refused — probably out of fear of the consequences.

The findings of the first part of the study in companies with above-average female employment (clothing, electrical engineering, precision mechanics and foodstuffs) show that women's jobs have specific characteristics: the industrial work processes are divided up into small, indeed minute, units, having to be carried out every few minutes or, in some instances, fractions of a minute.

This requires little specialised ability, independent thinking or skill. At the same time the physical and psychological demands, due to the uniformity of the work and the speed of the individual processes, are considerable. In most cases, the worker finds it impossible to switch off mentally or to adapt the work to individual taste.


The work in offices and the retail trade, where most workers are women, is less monotonous. But there is a trend towards simplification of activities due to electronic changes, self-service and data processing. This again means shorter work units, less call for qualifications, physical and mental stress and reduced scope of action, thus likening the jobs to those in industry.

On the other hand, complex activities traditionally requiring specialised skills, such as the job of saleswoman in a specialty store, provide a relatively large scope of action without excessive stress.

Researchers questioned *499* working women to clarify their assessment of a working life. All of them had full-time jobs and had done the same work in the same company for at least a year; 372 were blue-collar workers (on assembly lines, in packaging, seamstresses, ironers and machine operators); 47 had white-collar jobs with simple activities (data typists and automatic typewriter operators); 80 had jobs requiring higher qualifications (saleswomen and senior office staff).

A main finding of the study is that working women are not indifferent to and uncritical of their working conditions. They neither idealise work nor do they tend to complain without specific cause.

On the contrary, their evaluations are marked by astuteness and a sense of reality.



(Cartoon: Burkhard Blütow/Die Zeit)

Blue-collar workers and their white-collar counterparts doing simple work arrive at a much more unfavourable assessment than more qualified workers.

Almost one in two blue-collar workers sees no interesting aspect at all in her work. An equal number fear they will be unable to take the stress in the long run, and one in three considers herself underpaid.

The same applies to white-collar workers doing simple work, of whom not even one in two believes she will be able to take the stress over a prolonged period. Two-fifths consider themselves underpaid.

This is in contrast to the more highly qualified white-collar workers, of whom 86 per cent consider their work at least partially interesting and bearable even in the long run. However, one in two salesladies considers herself underpaid.

General work satisfaction thus largely depends on aspects such as type of work, stress, pay, social contacts, job security and family obligations.

All in all, among the satisfied are primarily the more highly-qualified white-collar workers, of whom two-thirds were quite positive. Women doing less qualified and strenuous work are marked by resignation, ambiguity and out-and-out dissatisfaction (primarily among white-collar workers doing simple work).

This makes it the more surprising that only one in five would rather not *work at all. This essentially positive atti*tude towards work, even where the job is unsatisfactory, is because the housewive's role, marked by isolation and financial dependence, has become unattractive.

It must, however, be said that of the blue-collar and white-collar workers doing simple work, only one in two is convinced of the advantages of employment over being a housewife — the blue-collar workers stressing financial advantages while the others emphasising social contact at work. Only the more highly qualified white-collar workers reject the housewife role, at the rate of three in four.

The conclusions to be drawn from the study are still uncertain. The employers, in a preliminary comment, console themselves with the latter facts and with the fact that women with greater family burdens "naturally" consider their work more overtaxing.

They concede that progressive automation imposes a particular onus on the employer to make work more interesting to prevent dissatisfaction.

The call for full vocational training, supported by the unions and the Federal Labour Office, applies in particular to blue-collar workers, of whom less than 50 per cent are fully trained and thus stand no chance of promotion.

The problem is more complicated for white-collar workers doing simple work, since many of them are already overqualified for the job.

Reducing the double burden for women through more part-time jobs is hampered by the cost and lack of flexibility on the part of women — most of them wanting to work in the mornings. On the other hand, there is the danger of perpetuating jobs that demand little and entail a high degree of stress.

The trade unions and the Federal Labour Office have called on employers to reassess work and redesign it to make it attractive both from the viewpoint of physical and psychological stress and that of motivation.

Not only women but society as a whole must be convinced that permanent employment for women should be taken for granted. *Verena Deutelmoser*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 October 1978)

Call for more emphasis on job training

According to a study by the Federal Institute for Vocational Training, almost one in six young people left a vocational school or special vocational school as an unskilled worker in the past few years.

This means some 80,000 young people crowd the labour market without hope of starting a worthwhile career.

For the individual, this lack of training means that the risk of becoming unemployed, of having a below-average income and of being unable to adjust to structural changes through further education is 50 per cent greater than that of trained workers.

The unskilled workers of the 50s provide the bulk of today's jobless without vocational training, who account for two-thirds of German unemployed.

It would therefore be more helpful to invest the DM1,800 a month which a jobless worker costs society in vocational training.

According to the study, carried out in 1975 and 1976, the training deficit is mostly passed on from parents to children: only 35 to 40 per cent of the fathers and 13 to 16 per cent of the mothers of the unskilled young people interviewed had vocational training. Two-thirds of the unskilled come from "socially weak" families.

The study holds that the number of unskilled young people who were unable to find an apprenticeship is about to increase.

There were at least 38,000 such youngsters in September 1976 — 10,000 more than official statistics based on reported cases indicate.

On average, these youngsters applied unsuccessfully three times for an apprenticeship.

More than half resigned themselves to lack of success and to having to accept an unskilled job within a short time.

Among those seeking apprenticeships, girls (63 per cent) are over-represented.

ddp

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 17 October 1978)

■ MOTORING

Traffic expert warns over Hamburg's jammed future

Hamburg's city surveyor Günther Bentfeld forecast a gloomy future for city traffic at the Hamburg road research conference.

"In a few years congestion at key intersections and road junctions will be so bad that city traffic will be at a standstill most of the time," he told the meeting.

Both private and public transport would be affected. The answer was for the authorities to step up roadbuilding in urban areas.

A Hamburg survey has shown that traffic on the city's main roads stays at between 80 and 90 per cent of the rush-hour level from 9am to 3pm.

By 1990, the survey forecasts, Hamburg's main roads will have to handle almost the present level of rush-hour traffic throughout the day.

If this and other forecasts made at the conference are right, rush-hour traffic in many cities will last all day. More cars than ever are coming off the assembly lines, much to economists' satisfaction.

Professor Schaechterle of Munich, basing his figures on recent demand forecasts, told the conference that the number of private cars, now just under 22 million, should increase to between 25 and 26 million by 1990.

About 40 per cent would be family second cars.

But the cities stand to be crammed with pressed steel: cars either waiting in traffic jams or parked. They will be enveloped in toxic exhaust fumes and full of drivers and passengers caught between anxiety and aggression.


This is what city centres may look like if the gloomy forecasts come true, but not only the centres will be affected.

More and more people are moving from the city centre to the outskirts, where jobs will need to be found for them, says Professor Schaechterle.

The result will be a big increase in traffic on the outskirts of town, and unless action is taken traffic will come to a standstill there too.

The Hamburg conference showed the difficulties town and road planners encounter as they try to solve problems.

For one, politicians and economists seem to agree that higher vehicle output is inevitable and a necessity.



Car-owners can hardly be blamed for wanting to use their cars, not only for business trips and weekend outings but also to work and for shopping.

Public transport, forecasters agree, will make little difference in the future. Appeals to motorists to leave the car at home once in a while have proved unsuccessful in the past.

A few years ago roadbuilding reached record levels, but now there is a tendency to slow down, which Herr Bentfeld feels is a contradiction.

"On the one hand an increase in vehicular traffic above all past forecasts is welcomed. On the other there is a growing reluctance to build roads to cater for the increase in traffic."

The motor trade and roadbuilding are seen as unconnected, he feels. More than 600,000 vehicles are registered in Hamburg, or one for every three people.

The public are now concerned about the environment and less willing to allow roadbuilders to build on regardless than they once were.

But of course they are not prepared to go the whole way and forgo the doubtful pleasure of motoring.

Bonn Transport Minister Kurt Gscheidle left the conference in no doubt that the federal government's priority is the environment:

"Ecological problems are the main reason why we no longer are able or willing to build as many roads as might be needed to cater for all traffic situations," he said.

If it came to a choice between noise abatement and new roads priority had to be given to noise abatement. Nature conservation especially in recreation areas within easy reach of cities, had in future to be seen as no less important than noise.

The environment was a keynote of the conference, which dealt with topics such as environmental road planning, protection from traffic noise, roadbuilding and country planning and traffic restrictions in residential areas.

But if there are no plans to build enough roads to cope with traffic, politicians and planners are soon going to have to come up with a few good ideas.

Herr Gscheidle favours careful extensions of the existing road network but would first like to see existing roads put to best use, spreading the burden of traffic and "harmonising" traffic flow.

This presumably means better crisis management at congestion points. In Hamburg he referred to radio road reports for motorists and to traffic jam diversions.

Both are part of a traffic control programme to ease congestion on through-roads between Oberhausen in the Ruhr and Karlsruhe in the south.

On part of the autobahn network west of Dortmund a dashboard autopilot experiment is in progress, with roadside relay stations and induction loops in the road surface monitoring and redirecting traffic to avert congestion.

But these programmes are unlikely to be much help in cities, where the only solution may be tunnels, which are costly but do not take up even more space than existing roads and can be an environmental blessing.

How motorists are going to feel down in the tunnels is another matter.

Karsten Plog

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 October 1978)

Figures pinpoint citical times for accidents

Fewer road accidents occur on Thursdays than on any other day of the week. Fifteen per cent more occur on Friday and 30 per cent more on Saturday, according to motor insurers, traffic police and psychologists.

They have also found that there are times when certain kinds of accidents predominate. In October, for instance, most pile-ups involve the car in front occur.

Between December and February head-on, or at least side-on, collisions are more common. From May to September intersections and junctions are the black spots.

Is there any explanation for these patterns? Experts avoid the question, saying that once you know what is most likely to happen when, you can avoid the danger.

Provided you accept that accidents are usually more than sheer coincidence, you can learn facts to your advantage and have a clear idea of what may happen.

There are, for instance, critical times of day. Many commuters are on the road between 6am and 7am, and many are not fully awake and alert to the dangers of traffic.

Yet fewer accidents occur in proportion to the amount of traffic between six and seven than between seven and eight, when latecomers are in a hurry to reach work on time.

Another critical period is when the rush-hour is over and motorists feel they can concentrate on the day ahead.

But accident frequency mostly coincides with traffic density. It peaks towards 7pm and then declines slowly, more slowly than might be expected.

Most accidents happen in the afternoon rush-hour, between five and six when commuters are going home. They use the same roads as in the morning and there are the same number of them.

But more than twice as many accidents occur in the afternoon. Motorists are tired, nervous, and keen to get home. Their reactions are slower and they are more likely to act without thought.

The commuter is on his way home from work, with only another 15 minutes ahead of him, and he usually has more on his mind than the traffic.

Besides, a day's work leaves its mark on all of us, although we frequently do not realise how great the strain has been until we are able to relax a little, the first chance often being on the drive home.

The only way to deal with this is to remind oneself before setting out for home that everyone is *more tired than* first thing in the morning, so allowances must be made.

Motorists may take half a second longer to brake in the evening. At 60 km/h, or 38mph, their braking distance is going to be eight metres longer.

On Friday afternoon everyone is keener to get home. People are tired and impatient to start their weekend. They take unnecessary risks to avoid losing what they see as part of the time they have been looking forward to all week.

On Friday commuters often pick up members of the family on the way home, which increases the accident risk. So motorists should make a point of limiting their speed and keeping their distance on Fridays.

There are times of the day, the week, and the year when everyone is not fully alert and difficulties may arise at the wheel. This calls less for advanced motoring thats for awareness of the risk.

So it is as well to know that driving can be more difficult early in the morning, during the evening rush-hour and at the beginning of a season.

Statistics bring strange facts to light and there are times when accidents are less frequent than average.

So motorists will be relieved to hear that drivers very seldom lose control between 9am and 10am and that fewer drivers back into an obstacle between 4am and 5am (five times fewer than between 1am and 2am).

February and March are the most accident-free months of the year, either because people take special care or because they are down with influenza.

autopress

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 18 October 1978)

■ TECHNOLOGY

Computer's place is in the kitchen now

AEG-Telefunken is to computerise first the kitchen, then the entire home, Ulrich Schmidt of the company's research and development division told reporters at a press conference in Braunlage in the Harz mountains south of Hanover.

Tiny computers are seen as running the home, from central heating to TV, and supervising routine jobs.

The home computer as devised in the AEG-Telefunken research laboratories will memorise household data, do simple sums, reach logical decisions and process information relayed by sensors and other measuring equipment.

It will also be designed to allow extra equipment to be plugged into the system.

The home computer could emerge as the head of an entire family of microcomputers carrying out all kinds of operations in rooms all over the house.

Initially it will mainly supervise work in the kitchen, where washing machines and electric stoves already use a variety of programmes.

The number of programmes available in household equipment has increased rapidly over the past 20 years, Herr Schmidt says.

Automatic units sold in the early 60s had a maximum of 16 mechanical and electrical functions. The latest equipment can handle up to three dozen operations.

Electronic cookers now on the market incorporate microprocessors — a key feature of the computer revolution. They store up to 120 cooking, roasting and baking programmes.

Microcomputers will supervise operations even more efficiently than the present generation of, say, washing machines, which are limited to their pre-selected programme.

No attention is paid to how dirty the washing is or the colour of water in the drum.

Much the same is true of the Sunday roast in the oven. The oven can be set to switch on at a certain time and stay at a certain temperature for a specific period, but half-baked potatoes remain half-baked and burnt joints cannot be unburnt.

Microcomputers can be programmed to respond to reports that the water in the washing machine is dirtier than usual. Without consulting the householder they can decide to add more water or detergent or increase the temperature. Development engineers are not satisfied with the idea of a battery of microcomputers independently running various items of equipment. They envisage a central control to make sure that too much is not expected of the mains electric supply at any time and that equipment is used economically.

The home computer will, for instance, be programmed to ensure that major units are not all switched on simultaneously. If the computer is briefed on fluctuations in demand it can spread power consumption more evenly throughout the day.

But much will depend on information relayed by a network of sensors in equipment and rooms. Without this the computer cannot update instructions. Sensors are under development.

In a few years the cost of microcomputers will plummet, Herr Schmidt says. Eventually they will amount to a mere fraction, say a tenth, of the price of an item of household equipment.

Mechanical equipment will increase in price, with the result that microcomputers will make headway in the home mainly because they are cheaper.

Another development just tested is optical cable to relay telephone calls.

Twelve years ago an AEG-Telefunken research scientist hit on the idea of relaying communications by light wave and applied for a patent.

Telephone subscribers in West Berlin are the first in Germany to benefit from the idea. A 4.5-kilometre (three mile) trial section of optical cable is in use in the divided city.

(Cartoon: Felix Mussil/Frankfurter Rundschau)

In theory TV, newspapers and data of all kinds can be relayed to any home by optical cable consisting of hair-thin threads of glass.

AEG-Telefunken's Theodor Pfeiffer is so pleased with the performance of optical cables that he expects new uses to be feasible that in the past have been difficult or impossible.

Optical cable will certainly be able to handle a volume of telecommunications *inconceivable using conventional copper.*

The experimental cable now in use can handle 480 calls simultaneously. Four times this number seems feasible, research scientists and engineers say.

Trials in Berlin and the Federal Republic will soon show whether optical cable can take over from metal, satisfactorily replacing conventional cables that grow more expensive as raw materials become scarcer.

Glass as a raw material is most unlikely ever to become scarce and expensive.

Not until company mains are fitted with more efficient and inexpensive equipment such as optical cable will home computers be able to link up with larger data banks and computers.

For this the postal authorities will need to rewire the entire country, which will obviously take time. *Dieter Tasch*

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 13 October 1978)

'Factories in space by year 2000'

By 2000 scientists in America and Western Europe expect the first factories to start manufacturing goods in outer space.

Twenty years later they reckon electric power will be generated in outer space and relayed to earth, another breathtaking advance.

More than 120 scientists from all over the world met at Munich University of Technology for a conference organised by Esa, the European Space Agency.

Most represented companies associated with the European Spacelab project. They discussed ways in which outer space may benefit man.

This first conference of its kind in Europe dealt mainly with problems of regulating the climate on board space capsules where astronauts are expected to work for months on end.

In recent years space travel seems to have stopped in the West, especially in Western Europe, but Spacelab should reverse the trend.

US assistance is still essential, however. Spacelab will be put into orbit by the US Space Shuttle, a Nasa craft which is a cross between a rocket and an aircraft, with a fuselage fitted out to launch and retrieve bulky space capsules.

A prototype is to be launched next year and scientists hope to perfect the system in about 20 flights. They will then be able to operate bases in outer space some time in the 90s.

Spacelab is designed to carry out a wide range of missions. It could help prospect for natural resources on earth or monitor environmental pollution.

It could also be used as a laboratory for the manufacture of drugs and for metallurgical experiments that cannot be undertaken on earth because of physical conditions.

The power station in outer space may sound optimistic in comparison, yet it is merely the next step in development. Satellites harnessing solar energy would be put into orbit.

Equipment would be sent up by Space Shuttle, which would run services twice a day. *Norbert Klaschka/dpa*

(Neue Ruhr Zeitung, 14 October 1978)

■ PERFORMING ARTS

All the fun of the circus at Berlin Festival

For almost four weeks Berliners and visitors have been able to take advice of the city's festival slogan and "Have Fun, Go to the Festival Circus."

This year's autumn festival offered those who picked any performances from the great many offered plenty of fun: the festival theme "Zirkus, Circus, Cirque" provided 30 variations on the theme — more than a reporter can cover.

A festival trying to attract visitors from abroad should pay more attention to the principle that quality comes be-



Milan Sladek of Cologne's Kafka Theatre in a moment of clowning sadness at the Berlin Festival. (Photo: Ursula Zeidler)

fore quantity. Not all performances were of a worthy standard.

Among the high points was, in the second half of the festival, Hilfried Foron's Schlemmer adaptation *Varieté, Varieté*, in which the Tübingen Chamber Theatre demonstrated how an idea can be realised creatively and artistically.

With his small theatre group, Foron reconstructed Schlemmer's Comical Ballet of 1937, never performed before due to the cost.

The result was a one-and-a-half hour non-stop carousel of fantastic circus characters and scenes, reviving the imagery of Surrealism, Dadaism and Constructivism.

Schlemmer's visions came to life in an abstract circus with long-legged thin elephants, constantly changing white monsters without head and limbs, giants playing with an outsize balloon, a foxtrot of dancing robots, harlequins who with every movement made doll-like doubles dance in front and behind them.

The Tübingen visitors presented it all with obvious and pleasurable joy.

The greatest substance was in the shortest act, that of the famous Italian brothers Carlo and Alberto Colombaioni, familiar from Fellini films. They are clowns, acrobats, jugglers, mimes, trapeze artists and actors.

Carlo, a small, dark-haired charmer, is a clever, modern variation on a medieval jester who turns out to be not stupid but extremely foxy.

Alberto, tall and blond, is a descendent of the wise clown who is supposed to be stupid.

Every idea, no matter how simple, is

Nordwest Zeitung

worked into a deep and yet absurd mini-drama.

For example: Carlo wants to become a cowboy. He twirls invisible six-shooters and fires. Alberto drops dead and is covered with a blanket. Feet and head remain visible, and then the body rises to form a bier and moves away: a corpse carrying itself.

Circus and show business are closely related and so the performance of Canadian Craig Russell in the Renaissance Theatre was perfectly in keeping with the theme of the Berlin festival.


This drag artist, who earned himself a Silver Bear as best performer of the last festival in the film *Ausgeflippt*, is one of the top names in show business.

He does not need to resort to a tape recorder in his 90-minute imitations of the voices of stars. He sings himself and his range extends from Peggy Lee via Bette Davis all the way to Barbra Streisand.

His voice encompasses four-and-a-half octaves, and a duet by Louis Armstrong and Ella Fitzgerald is Russell's pièce de résistance.

The climax, however, is Craig Russell as Judy Garland and daughter Liza Minelli, where the entertainer gets a chance to demonstrate the breadth of his range.

In choosing the circus as the theme, the organisers had in mind not only popular circus entertainment, but wanted to demonstrate that jugglers, harlequins and clowns have always inspired the arts. Teatro 7 from Milan and Ferrucio Soler's Servant of Two Masters by Goldoni, in the famous staging by Strehler, brought one of the major figures of European theatre history to Berlin: the harlequin with the leather mask and checkered costume, a young, hungry man possessing nothing and having to rely entirely on wit and cunning. Those who prefer the theatre to cabaret were somewhat short-changed this time. Freie Volksbühne (free people's theatre) presented No Payment by the Italian Dario Fo. This turned out to be political theatre, revolving around the looting of a supermarket by Milan housewives engaging in "nationalisation from below". The piece, seemingly a farce, falls short of the genre, which should ridicuule



Under the spotlight: a scene from Samuel Beckett's Play, performed by the Schiller Theater at the Berlin Festival. (Photo: Ilse Buhs)

stupidily and human weakness. Instead, it almost seems to have its origins in the ideology of Italy's Red Brigades.

But the class struggle slogans are lost in the laughter given to to the witty and lively staging by Roland Schäfer.

The workshop of the *Schiller Theater* presented heavier fare. Samuel Beckett continued the series of Berlin performances with works of his own.

Although two pieces from the early 60s were performed without a break, the actual theatre evening lasted only 45 minustes.

Schiller Theater presented Play and Come and Come, arranged by Beckett's assistant Walter D. Asmus.

The latter was virtually the theme of the Beckett evening reducing human existence to the briefest possible formula,





Oskar Schlemmer's Figure in Space, 1924, in the Museum of Modern Art, New York. This year's Berlin Festival saw a presentation of Schlemmer's Comical Ballet of 1937. (Photo: Katalog)

Beckett's plays, which are becoming shorter, always leave the audience with something to ponder long after leaving the theatre.

In Come and Go three women in multi-coloured dresses, wearing ugly hats covering their faces, sit on a bench. Their conversation, of which only fragments can be heard, revolves around the past, youth, and love.

When one of them disappears in the dark for a few seconds, the others start whispering nasty things about her. But in the end the three, their arms around each other, form a unit again.

The other piece, Play, surprises by the manner in which author Beckett removes it from reality in his capacity as director.

There are three huge urns, and from their necks peer the heads of two women and a man — evidently no longer in this world but not quite in the other either. Formerly, they had been a *ménage à trois*: wife, husband and lover.

A spotlight rests on the heads in turn. Whoever gets hit by it must talk. The audience learns that the two women were in love with the man while he vacillated between them.

Beckett made his actors speak in a hectic and breathless way, and when the three try to justify their feelings and their attitudes it sounds like a tape run at high speed.

The guest performance of the Zurich Opera House of the Monteverdi Cycle was a great success. Audiences (it was sold out weeks ahead) not only witnessed a historic theatrical event, but also saw three fascinating stagings by Jean Pierre Ponnelle.

The Zurich Opera succeeded in presenting the only three existing operas by Claudio Monteverdi (1567—1643), Orfeo, The Coronation of Poppea, and The Return of Ulysses to His Country in their original form and adapted for the modern stage.

The Zurich adaptations, which gave new life to the works of the Monteverdi Cycle are based primarily on the research work of Nikolaus Harnoncourt, a specialist in old music. Harnoncourt, who also conducted all three, has delved into the style problems of early Baroque music.

To recapture the assumed original sound as much as possible, his costumed musicians played historical instruments with a surprisingly bright and light tone.

These instruments are the forerunners of today's string and wind instruments

Continued on page 11

■ CINEMA

Berlin takes a gamble to win back its film reputation

Israeli film producer Yoram Globus takes another despairing look out of the window of the small café in Lichterfelde, West Berlin.

"If the rain doesn't stop in the next half-hour we'll get no more filming today and I stand to lose DM50,000," he grumbles.

Thirty extras dressed in colourful turn-of-the-century clothes are sitting in the dark, smoke-filled cafe on a dull, late September evening.

They are waiting to film a two-minute scene for the US-Israeli co-production The Sorcerer, based on the novel The Sorcerer of Lublin by Nobel laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer.

A quiet side street looks just as Singer describes buildings in Warsaw at the turn of the century, says director Menahem Golan.

Camera crews in yellow oilskins have set up their equipment under enormous umbrellas and the horse-drawn cab that is to drive male lead Alan Arkin to the scene is on standby. But the rain keeps falling.

The producer grows increasingly nervous. His director takes a more philosophical view: "We are only two days behind schedule: We will have finished our last take in a week."

But Globus is still upset at the though of DM50,000 wasted: washed along the rain-soaked streets and down the drain. Then someone shouts: "The rain has stopped!"

Everyone rushes out into the Warsaw street scene. The cab arrives and the extras stroll up and down as though it were a warm summer evening, not a chilly autumn one.

A quarter of an hour later the take is safely on film and it is raining again.

Filmmakers in West Berlin this year have had frequent cause to curse the weather.

The sets for location filming of Lublin, in the West Berlin surburb of Haselhorst, were covered with mud. But only the superstitious reckon this bodes ill for the divided city's efforts to regain its status as a motion picture centre.

The Sorcerer is one of three international films shot in Berlin this year. Producers and directors are vying to shoot footage in the city next year.

What is more, they are not just films with Berlin as their theme, such as Golan's Escape to the Sun (1971) and Bob Fosse's Cabaret (1972).

The reason is straightforward. West Berlin is subsidising selected projects, with the Senate, or city council, paying up to 30 per cent of production costs, or a maximum DM2,000,000.

Foreign filmmakers with suitable projects qualify. Box office is the criterion.

Films are subsidised if the authorities are satisfied they stand a fair chance of commercial success.

West Berlin is paying the full two million towards the cost of The Sorcerer. "It's a drop in the ocean when costs total DM11,000,000, but it is most encouraging for a city to back a film. It was a godsend as far as I am concerned," says director Golan.

The subsidy must be repaid as soon as the film starts earning money. If it flops the city will write off the debt. Golan is confident he will able to repay before long.

The other films West Berlin has backed this year could also prove box-office successes. In early spring David Hemmings filmed his wide-screen spectacular *Schöner Gigolo, armer Gigolo*, starring Marlene Dietrich and David Bowie, in Berlin.

John Sturgess shot most of *Steiner II* (The Breakthrough) in Berlin, and Volker Schlöndorff has returned from location work in Danzig to shoot more scenes from his version of the Günter Grass novel The Tin Drum in the divided city.

Next year Sean Connery is to play the lead in a film based on John Le Carre's thriller A Small Town in Germany (although the small town in the novel is Bonn, not Berlin).

John Schlesinger is to direct Czardas and Richard Burton, a frequent guest in *Berlin, is starring in The Cooler.* Menahem Golan has also booked accommodation for next April, when he plans to film Ephraim Kishon's The Marriage Lines.

The city has been hearteningly successful in inducing filmmakers to work in Berlin, but difficulties remain.

"If Berlin really wants to become a centre of international filmmaking something will have to be done about the studios," says producer Globus.

He is referring to the CCC studios in Spandau where Artur Brauner shot many memorable post-war films. More than one post-war West German film in three was shot at "Atze" Brauner's Spandau studios in the 50s.

But the slump hit Berlin hard, and the CCC studios now look like an epitaph to golden days. They are in mothballs and no longer provide the service international filmmakers expect.

They lack the equipment, the staff and the soundproofing, the last essential because the studios are close to Tegel airport, as Globus ruefully notes.

"We had to stop and start because of the earsplitting aircraft noise. It cost us two full days' filming."

The only alternative is the Ufa studios, but they are usually booked months ahead for TV and advertising films.

So Brauner plans to modernise his studios as fast as possible and to expand too, since the city is willing to advance the capital.

Studios may still be a problem, but visiting filmmakers are delighted with Berlin in other respects. "The Berliners are most helpful and their film laboratories could hardly be more efficient," says Golan.

West Berlin seems to be back on its way to the top, but not all the groundwork has been laid.

The city must offer definite advantages if film teams are to keep coming, providing both reputation and employment for technicians.

Margarete von Schwarzkopf

(Die Welt, 11 October 1978)

Continued from page 10

some of them bearing such curious names as chitarrino, dulcimer and regal.

The objective was to familiarise the audience, used to post-romantic harmony, with the origins of our music.

The fact that song and drama complement each other in the Zurich ensemble is assuredly the result of many years of work. Harnoncourt, the singers, and the splendid orchestra received a standing ovation — and deserved it.

Hans Dornbach

(Nordwest Zeitung, 12 October 1978)

Moroccan newcomer is star of Mannheim

Newcomer Ahmed el Maanouni, 34, swept the board at the 27th Mannheim film festival, winning both the Mannheim grand prix and the prize of the International Repertory Cinema Association.

Alyam Alyam (The Days) was his first film and the first winner from Morocco. Mannheim has never before (and other festivals seldom) honoured entries from countries not well established in filmmaking.

In what is part feature, part documentary, he outlines against a background of breathtaking landscapes a theme typical of many developing countries.

A young peasant leaves his tradition-laden, slow-changing rural environment *to seek freedom and a new life in* France. But the big, alien city not only shatters his dreams; it destroys his self-confidence.

We are shown the events in unsentimental sequence. No attempt is made to introduce an element of fake folklore. The hero's fate is seen as inevitable.

Oddly enough, the Protestant Church award went to Alambrista by Robert N. Young of the United States, a film with a similar story, albeit told with greater technical proficiency.

This is the story of an illegal Mexican immigrant in the United States who finds neither regular work nor more than fleeting happiness. Deeply disappointed, he is first deported, then returns home of his own free will.

After seeing all 38 entries one must admit that the jury chose well in awarding the grand prix to an Afro-Arab film. It was, incidentally, an international jury on which Senegalese director Safi Faye represented Africa.

The Afro-Arab countries were an impressive presence at Mannheim this year. At a seminar lasting several days their filmmakers discussed production and distribution problems.

But the seven members of the jury cannot have found it easy to choose. They awarded a special prize to Theatre Girls, a British tale of the drab life of two young women in a London hostel.

Another British winner was Anthony Thomas for his Six Days in Soweto. He won one of the five Mannheim ducats *and the International Film Critics'* award.

The other four ducat-winners were A Ritual, a village tragedy from India, Like A Tortoise on My Back, the biography of an intellectual, from France, With Babies and Banners, from the United States, and Here on This Street Corner, a working-class tale from the Soviet Union.

The country that won most awards was Switzerland, with four, followed by Britain, Italy, the United States and the Soviet Union, with three each.

Entries from the two German states were sometimes interesting but failed to win awards. GDR entries were not even mentioned, and only one entry from the Federal Republic was named by the Roman Catholic jury: Cristina Perincioli's The Might of Men is the Patience of Women, the story of a women's refuge in West Berlin.

Nazis — Are There Still Any Around? by Ulrich Leinweber was recommended by the Volkshochschule jury, while Michael Bückner and Haro Senft each won a DM1,000 cash prize and a DM50,000 film contract.

A prize for the best television film was not awarded because the jury was not satisfied with the definition of the genre.

Young filmmakers from all over the world are attaching greater importance to formal precision in addition to social commitment, and a surprising number of women are now making films.

Mannheim was as successful as ever, with the emphasis on first films, lengthy documentaries and films from the developing world (Africa this year).

About 26,000 visitors, including 200 journalists, saw and discussed some 150 films from all over the world.

Hannes Schmidt

(Kieler Nachrichten, 16 October 1978)

Mannheim Film Festival ducat winner: Here on This Street Corner, a Soviet entry about road builders. (Photo: Die Welt)

■ TERROR

Violence without ideology: the terrorists of the 1970s

In the year since the assassination of industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer on October 1977, there have been no spectacular terrorist actions in the Federal Republic of Germany. But terrorism is not dead, public discussion has not ended, and researchers, politicians and publicists have seized upon the issue. One of the most frequently inquiries is into the roots of the new terrorism.

In the 1950s and early 1960s no-one in the Federal Republic of Germany could predict the wave of terrorism which began a decade later on 2 April 1968 with fires in two department stores in the heart of Frankfurt.

Yet it is irresistably tempting to prove in retrospect why terrorism, generally considered an obsolete historic phenomenon, had to return.

Familiarity with history is useful in such an undertaking. Did not Nietzsche a century ago prophesy what we are experiencing today? He spoke of the forthcoming "self destruction of the under-endowed," describing them as vividly as if he had interviewed Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof.

He wrote: "...the instinctive drive to commit acts that would make the powerful of this world mortal enemies (breeding one's own executioners so to speak), the desire to destroy as the will of an even lower instinct, the instinct of self destruction and the wish for nothingness."

Nietzsche's premonitions are not all that startling, considering that then an important forerunner of today's terrorists, the Russian *Narodnaya Volya*, was widely discussed.

In September 1878, its "Revolutionary People's Court" sentenced Czar Alexander II to death in exactly the same way as the "People's Court" of the Red Brigades in Italy pronounced the death sentence on Aldo Moro.

Anarchist attacks were no rarity in the days when the whole of Europe read Mikhail Bakunin's Principles of Revolution, in which the author said: "We recognise no other methods than destruction ..."

The main question occupying politicians and researchers is: why are we experiencing a rebirth of terrorism at a time of unprecedented affluence and in a country which is not a police state as was Czarist Russia in the 19th century but enjoys a very high degree of freedom?

There is no social phenomenon not attributable to the state of society. As a result, we must all ask ourselves where we went wrong.

Did the older generation show too little understanding for the younger? Did it, in its zeal to overcome the collapse of 1945, overlook the fact that different questions occupied their children?

Has our world, having overcome material misery, now become so devoid of more far-reaching aims, so devoid of meaning as to make the protest of the young inevitable?

The answer is made more difficult by the fact that German terrorists, although mostly from the educated bourgeoisie, are making almost no effort to explain their objectives.

Only the first generation of German terrorists, wiped out by the suicide of Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, made some attempts at drafting an ideology.

At the time the intellectual leaders of terrorism believed in freeing mankind from exploitation through a grand alliance with the peoples of the Third World and the workers of the Western industrial countries. Jointly they wanted to destroy capitalism.

But this illusion has long dissipated due to the total disinterest of the working classes.

Today's third generation of terrorists has no ideology. And if they are looking for justification for their murderous deeds at all they are only fighting a bogeyman of their own making, the alleged "new fascism" and the "police state."

It seems to have become their main objective to provoke the state into over-reacting.

But if the police were really as powerful as the terrorists say they would long ago have coped with the estimated 100, at most 200, German terrorists.

Since the terrorists themselves shed so little light on their motives there is no limit to speculation.

The most conspicuous element in the debate on terrorism is the boldness with which various groups have seized the opportunity to again sell their musty theories.

A few examples will suffice:

The theory of the other's guilt: There are those who say "the terrorists are leftists and hence must be blamed on the Marxists." Others hold that "the capitalist society is the breeding ground of terrorism and blame attaches to those who insist on preserving this society."

Glad to have found another battlefield on which to fight the old dispute between "freedom and socialism," a Don Quixotic fight of ideologists, they abuse terrorism as a weapon in their own dispute instead of joining forces to combat it.

Placing the blame on the zeitgeist: Terrorism has been promoted by the destruction of old values and orders. As if terrorism had not existed in the Middle Ages, its proponents naively maintain that enlightenment and the loosening of religious ties as well as the traditional structure of society have made terrorism possible. They view it as a result of freedom and as an extreme form of hippiedom, saying they had long suspected where it would lead if young people were permitted to grow beards.

Placing the blame on the state: The whole malaise is due to the state failing to show understanding for young people, especially the 1968 student movement. Their keyword is "over-reaction," and they maintain that over-reaction by the state led, for example, to the death of the student Benno Ohnesorg in Berlin on 2 June 1967.

One of the most important terrorist groups, the Movement Second of June owes its name to and was prompted by this event. Ever since there has been a dark suspicion that German police are a sort of successor to the SA and SS.

Terrorism thus in many ways helps to confirm prejudices. But a careful examination of facts — on which most researchers fortunately base their theses — provides more solid ground. To start with, thiis usually leads to the simple finding that German terrorism is an offshoot of the "extra-parliamentary opposition" (APO) of the late sixties.

APO, which opposed the Grand Coalition of SPD and CDU-CSU in Bonn from 1966 to 1969, became shaky when Willy Brandt formed his "reform government" in 1969.

While the majority of APO followers jumped on the bandwagon of middle class careers, a minority became even more rabid, opting for resistance.

Two experiences had a major impact on APO: the Vietnam War and the assassination of Martin Luther Kind and, shortly thereafter, the wounding just before Easter of 1968 of the student leader Rudolf Dutschke.

The APO's *weltanschauung* was thus clearly established along these lines: Western imperialism has entered into a decisive phase, not even shirking murder. The only remedy is armed resistance. (The interpretation was wrong in both instances: in Vietnam, the United States did not act along the lines of Lenin's imperialism theory, and the attack on Dutschke was carried out by a misguided loner.)

But another element began to play an important role. The more the radical APO minority became criminal the more it had to seal itself off from the outside world. The circle within which it moved grew narrower and narrower.

The conspirators lived increasingly in an unreal world of ideas, permitting no contradiction and therefore precluding any test by the criteria of reality. Gradually they believed that only they were in possession of truth.

Part of this insanity was that the extremists saw themselves as a misunderstood elite, a feeling directed primarily against parents.

For the terrorists, their fathers were not so much blood relations as representatives of the generation which tolerated fasicm, to say the least, and in some instances promoted it.

When Susanne Albrecht participated in the killing of the banker Jürgen Ponto, a friend of her parents, she did so as an extreme form of rebellion against her parents.

Some psychologists also consider this an explanation for the high proportion of women in the inner circle of terrorists. Some 50 per cent seem to be women, while women's share in general crime is only 20 per cent.

According to the psychologists, this is due to a rebellion of young women against the dominance of father over mother at home.

But there is another explanation. One of the most wanted terrorists, the bomb specialist Michael Baumann, who has meanwhile left the terrorist scene, was asked in an interview how it felt to carry a gun.

He said: "It gives one a feeling of superiority. The gun takes all fear away and even the puniest man feels stronger than Cassius Clay. You *only have to* know how to pull the trigger, and any idiot knows that. Many succumb to this fascination."

The fascination must be particularly great for women who have left everything behind. With a gun in the handbag Women's Lib is absolute: she is the equal of every man and superior to the unarmed man.

Does terrorism — especially in Germany — have romantic traits? Are not the actions of terrorists sometimes reminiscent of Bonnie and Clyde whose adventures were watched with great pleasure by millions of "bourgeois" filmgoers, most assuredly opponents of terrorism?

The fact that the two movie heroes distributed their booty among the poor is of little significance. The Baaders and Meinhöfs of this world originally also killed in the belief that it would help the poor — especially in the developing countries — much more efficiently than by distributing the proceeds of bank robberies.


There is a certain playful element in this violence — a sort of cops and robbers game — not adequately taken into account by researchers. While this does not excuse anything, it is important as an indication of the curious adolescence and immaturity of terrorists.

The majority of German terrorists were between 20 and 25 when they joined gangs such as the Red Army Faction, Movement Second of June and Revolutionary Cells.

At that age a personality is still not fully developed, being in a "transition period from late puberty to adulthood," as the criminologist Gustav Nass puts it.

Bernd Rbehl, a former APO leader, sketched the young people attracted by terrorism today, terming them "frus-

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"Can't we sit here and discuss this matter rationally?"
(Cartoon: Wolter/Allgemeine Zeitung)

■ THE WORLD

Berlin meeting pushes open door to Chinese writing

Frankfurter Allgemeine

An international conference on literature, literary theory and criticism in People's China has just been held in West Berlin.

Organised by west Berlin Sinologists Wolfgang Kubin and Rudolf G. Wagner, it was the first time specialists in Chinese literature had ever met for an international exchange.

It was also to have been the first conference of its kind attended by a Chinese delegation since the Cultural Revolution, but the delegation was unable to come because of German bureaucratic obstructions.

There can be no mistaking the radical changes that have taken place in Chinese culture since the defeat of the Gang of Four two years ago.

A number of works decried as counter-revolutionary during the Cultural Revolution are being reprinted and selling briskly.

Many writers and artists who made reputations as long ago as the 20s are working again, which is not so much liberalisation as a return to normal after the cultural inflexibility of recent years.

The literary scene in China is currently dominated by an almost nostalgic revival of literature accumulated in past decades.

The reprints include Red Rock by Luo Guang-bin and Hurricane by Chou Li-po, both novels published in the early 70s by left-wing West German publishers as examples of revolutionary Chinese literature.

At the time of German publication they were branded in China as black, counter-revolutionary literature.

Yet Chou Li-po's Hurricane has been one of Chinas's most popular novels since it was first published in 1949. A new German-language translation is under preparation by the Foreign Language Publishing House, Peking.

A Chinese film based on the novel will shortly be screened on West German television.

Chou based his book on personal experience as head of a land reform team. He describes changes that took place in 1946-47 in Yuanmaotun, a small village in North China, which were typical of land reforms undertaken in large parts of China at the time.

The novel describes how peasants gain in political awareness and increasingly rebel at feudal land ownership.

It also describes the problems encountered by the Communist land reform team before they were accepted by the peasants.

A fresh look is also being taken at literature before the Communist takeover, such as the modern classic Shanghai at Twilight by Mao Dun.

For a time in the 20s the writer was Chairman Mao's private secretary. In the 30s he wrote a succession of important novels and continued until the Cultural Revolution to hold major cultural positions.

Shanghai at Twilight describes seven weeks in the life of the city, rocked by the repercussions of the slump and civil war in the early 30s.

It deals mainly with the doomed attempt of a Chinese industrialist to establish himself in the face of overpowering competition from foreign capital.

Mao Dun goes into the wider aspects in a succession of episodes that make up an unsurpassed literary panorama of the complexities and contradictions of Chinese society at the time.

It combines the traditions of the old Chinese novel and the critical realism of Tolstoy and Zola.

A new edition of the novel in German is to be published this autumn.

The Chinese novel is still thriving. Medieval chapbooks still fascinate readers in present-day China, as do traditional narratives handled in modern ways.

Take, for instance, the five-volume historical novel Li Tzu-ch'eng by Yao Hsueh-yin, which heads this year's best-seller list in China.

Yao began work in 1958 and the first part of the novel was published in 1963. Completion of the second part was delayed because he refused to incorporate the facile anti-Confucianism of the Gang of Four.

He had to write to Chairman Mao, who approved the novel as originally planned, before he could complete it. It was eventually published after the fall of the *Gang of Four*.

The book, based on meticulous historical research, describes a peasants' uprising under the leadership of Li Tzu-ch'eng during the late Ming dynasty.

It ranges far and wide, outlining the political conflicts, intrigues and military clashes of a society in decline shortly before the Manchu invasion.

The main characters are psychologically complex figures, not just the immaculate heroes and dastardly villains who used to predominate in literature because of reliance on the traditions of Peking opera.

Connections between literary tradition and the literature of new China were one of the main topics at the Berlin conference.

Traditional influence is encountered where one might least suspect it, as in Li Hsin-tien's novel Shining Star, rated a product of the Cultural Revolution but written in the early sixties.

A German translation was published in 1973, but sadly went largely unnoticed. To some extent autobiographical, the novel outlines the development of a poor peasant boy into an anti-Japanese resistance fighter and soldier in the People's Leberation Army.

Shining Star complies with Mao Tse-tung's call for a combination of revolutionary romanticism and revolutionary realism, but in structure, plot, and characterisation of the main figures it is also influenced by the medieval military romance, a genre still extremely popular in China.

There are many good translations of Chinese works into English but few into German. Not even such modern classics as Kuo Mojo, Pa Chin, Lao She and Chao Shu-li are available in German, let alone more recent writers such as Yang Mo or Hao Jan.

Chinese readers, on the other hand, can now read Goethe, Heinrich Mann and Böll's Lost Honour of Kathrina Blum.

Yet there is a public for good Chinese literature, as shown by the success of Hans Christoph Buch's Rowohlt edition of Lu Hsun essays, The Collapse of Lei-feng Pagoda.

Lu Hsun's short story The True Story of Ah Q has also been successfully dramatised at Bochum Schauspielhaus.

A change seems imminent, with the Berlin conference marking the start of the most ambitious literary venture in modern West German Sinology.

Wolfgang Kubin has assumed overall responsibility for a planned eight-volume edition of the collected works of Lu Hsun, including stories, poem, essays and letters.

Translations will be by a large number of West German Sinologists and will provide German readers for the first time with access to the works of an author long regarded internationally as a master.

Ingo Schäfer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 October 1978)

Universities to take in 450 Chinese students

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

The scientific cooperation treaty of 9 October between Bonn and Peking will hold out the possibility of 300 young Chinese scientists, 50 senior and 100 junior students attending German university courses after 1979.

Peking has said it wants these scientists and students to live with German families.

Details of the programme, which underscores the Chinese policy of opening up towards the West, have been discussed between China's Deputy Prime Minister Fang Yi and Walter Braun, president of the Standing Conference of German State Ministers of Education.

China wants the programme to start in 1979. Fang Yi made it clear that he considers 1980 "much too late."

The researchers and students will mostly be natural scientists, and to prepare them for their further studies in the Federal Republic Peking is interested in German lecturers (perhaps students) coming to China.

Herr Braun welcomed Mr Fang Yi's proposal to revive the tradition of Tung-Chi University in Shanghai, established as a German medical school in 1906 with German as its language.

The scientific cooperation treaty is initially for five years.

dpa

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 10 October 1978)

Experts predict more Third World clashes

Clashes in the Third World will increase in the 1980s, this year's West Berlin conference of the East European Studies Association has been told.

Forecasting political and economic developments in the decade ahead, the conference felt that while the West was interested in stability in the Third World, the Soviet Union was mainly interested in fomenting tension and unrest.

Cologne industrialist Otto Wolff von Amerongen also expected stiffer competition between the East bloc and developing countries on world markets.

Christoph Bertram of the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, dealt with the strategic significance of the Third World in East-West ties over the coming decade.

He forecast continued rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 80s and growing conflict in the Third World.

Apart from South Africa, a special case, this conflict would have less to do with East-West rivalry than with "traditional unsolved rivalries and domestic disputes, disputed frontiers, strivings for regional hegemony and religious clashes."

The world had changed and East-West rivalry was no longer the only (and not even the most dangerous) source of conflict, Bertram said.

The deterrent worked in the West and in the East bloc, but this by no means precluded the possibility of danger and threats.

The Soviet Union and the West had different interests regarding clashes between the developing countries. The industrialised West, he said, was mainly interested in unhindered access to commodity supplies.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was not primarily interested in raw materials, but with geographical considerations.

For Moscow the Third World had strategic significance because the Kremlin was keen to enhance its world power status.

Thus the Soviet Union relied mainly on military aid to gain political influence in the Third World. Little weight was attached to development aid.

Herr Bertram does not believe Soviet military intervention will bear political fruit. In his view intervention fails because it is based on self-interest and the Third World jealously guards its independence.

Besides, the political and economic importance of the developing countries was steadily increasing.

Regional conflicts might lead to international tension, he said. Unresolved issues in the Third World also provided the Soviet Union with ample opportunity of gaining political capital from military intervention, even though the gain might only be temporary.

Alwin Brück, parliamentary state secretary to the Bonn Economic Cooperation Ministry, called East-West ties anachronistic, but said this did not mean that they were no longer dangerous.

East-West rivalry should increasingly be regarded as a massive waste of resources on armaments. With 800 million people dying of starvation, it was madness to spend $350,000m a year on the arms race.

Peter Weertz

(Die Welt, 16 October 1978)

■ SOCIETY

Drug fighter spells out horrors

About 80 per cent of drug casualties die in their own beds, in friends' apartments or in a toilet, according to a report by a policeman on ten years' experience with addicts.

The outward circumstances of death through the nedle are as typical as the embryo posture of people dying from exposure: drug casualties are either prone and stretched out (when meeting death unconscious) or they are doubled over as if in pain (if death comes during withdrawal symptoms).

The man describing death from drugs is police officer Peter Loos, deputy head of the narcotics squad in Frankfurt, where this year's 25th drug death has just been recorded.

Herr Loos has spent a decade on the heroin front. The first two heroin deaths in Frankfurt occurred in 1969. By 1972, there were twelve.

The victims died of the consequences of years of drug abuse. In 1973 death from drugs changed its face in Frankfurt. For the first time the victims (three out of nine) died from overdoses. From then on, fatalities snowballed: 13 in 1974; 15 in 1975; 22 in 1976; 23 in 1977; and 25 so far this year — a total of 173 since 1969.

Herr Loos blames drug deaths on: overdoses; sensitive phases (temporary over-sensitivity to the drug); over-reaction to incompatible additives (strychnine and various tranquillisers); asphyxiation (the casualty is choked by his own vomit); chronic hepatitis as a result of drug abuse; and suicide.

Analysis of fatal drug addiction shows that the average addiction lasts for five years, ending in death in nine out of ten cases.

Three-fifths of this five-year period are spent with threshold drugs (hashish marijuana, valoron, mantrax and valium); the remaining two-fifths on hard drugs.

There are, of course, exceptions. Herr Loos has among his "customers" two fixers who have been mainlining for ten years. Both are so ill as to be walking corpses.

"Their brain damage is such that no hospital in the world could repair it," says Loos.

Peter Loos has asked numerous dealers about their lives over the past ten years. It turned out that 60 to 70 per cent were criminals to start with (larceny, burglary, dealing in stolen goods), and hoped to make more money by dealing in drugs.

Herr Loos sees only one way of putting an end to the heroin boom: "Demand must be made to drop to zero. The dealers will then disappear of their own accord."

Hans-Hellmuth Kannenberg

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 13 October 1978)

Youth aggression theories come under scrutiny

About 1,300 educationalists, jurists and others dealing with children attended a conference on aggression in children and juveniles held by Action Youth Protection of Baden-Württemberg in the Böblingen Congress Centre.

Five hundred people who wanted to attend could not get seats.

The two main papers read and discussions in a number of work groups were intended to provide answers on the causes of juvenile aggression.

In its invitation, Action Youth Protection warned against expecting solutions from the congress. The lack of answers became evident when, having read their papers, Professors Tobias Brocher, whose paper was called Agression from a Psycho-Social Vantage Point, and Paul Leyhausen, who delved into Aggression from a Bio-Anthropological Viewpoint, faced the critical questions of two specialised journalists.

Beatrice Flad-Schnorrenberg of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* probably expressed the feelings of the majority of those present when she pointed to the uncertainties still attached to aggression and its possible causes.

The reaction was largely due to the fact that Professor Brocher, after explaining the three most important theories on aggression — innate instinct, reaction to disappointment and imitation — went on to point out that none of these had been scientifically established.

It might also have been due to his putting forward the definition of American psychologists who hold that aggression is an attitude aimed at hurting others, then going on to elaborate on forms of aggression which did not fit this definition. But he had said from the beginning that the term "aggression" was unclear.

Nor did the congress contribute towards clarifying it or Professor Brocher could not have said at the end of the discussion: "We all have our aggressions ... thank goodness."

Like Leyhausen, he wanted to say that the jeopardy in which aggression places man is simply part of being human and all that matters is that this potential should not be understood as harmful in itself, the important thing being that no-one gets hurt by it.

Asked how one could learn this, Professor Brocher said education should give a high priority to the *evolution of sensitivity*, parents and teachers should talk to one other more and there should be more spontaneity in parent-child relations.

Elmar Reinauer

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 13 October 1978)

Essen therapists offer 'telephone sex course'

By dialling Essen 79 33 33 people in the Ruhr area can obtain advice on matters of sex every Monday between 7.00 and 9.00 p.m.

The Essen *Volkshochschule* (people's university, an adult education institution for extramural studies) was the first in the Federal Republic of Germany to do something about this delicate subject.

Initially, the telephone will be manned by a psychotherapist who is at the same time a medical doctor specialising in this field. Should the number of incoming calls be such as to overtax one man, additional experts will be provided.

Gerd Hergen Lübben, 41, the director of the *Volkshochschule*, dislikes the term "sex telephone" for his innovative idea.

To make it clear that the purpose of the operation is educational, he prefers to talk of a "telephone course on sex."

Says Herr Lübben: "What I envisage is not only for people with problems to make use of the new service, but also those who would simply like to obtain reliable information. As a result, I cannot see why we should treat the subject of sex as a taboo in our further education programme. Although sexual freedom has increased in the recent past, the number of people with problems in that sector has in no way diminished.

"In fact," he says, the opposite seems to be the case. There is a lack of information that would enable the people to make use of greater freedom in that sphere."

He would also like to see the public occupying itself with matters of sex as a "learning process."

Though much is being written on sex nowadays, Herr Lübben says there is a lack of custom-made information that would fit any given situation.

Many people shy away from consulting a doctor or counsellors. The "sex telephone" enables them to remain anonymous and openly discuss medical and family problems.

The counsellor at the other end of the line is also to remain anonymous. This enables him to make use of personal experience in counselling.

Says Dr. X: "I am very curious myself to see what will come of the project. So far, we have no experience with such a service to fall back on."

The caller can raise any question, ranging from the Pill via impotence all the way to abortion.

Since there are matters which cannot be clarified without an examination, Dr X wants to put his callers in touch with specialists, marriage counselling institutes and the like.

He might also recommend a *Volkshochschule* course (which was started simultaneously with the new service) entitled "Psycho-Social Counselling and Further Education in Matters of Sex." Attendance is not expected to exceed 20 initially.

There was a good reason to pick Monday as the day for the new service. Experience shows that most conflicts of this nature arise over the weekend.

Horst Zimmermann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 5 October 1978)

Treat speech blocks early say experts

About 1.2 million West Germans suffer from speech impediments says the German Society of Speech Therapy.

Some 18 to 20 per cent of pre-school age children stutter, stammer or lisp and 80 to 90 per cent of them could be spared special schools if their impediment were recognised and treated in time.

Suicide, particularly prevalent among stutterers due to their isolation, and homicide, as the psycho-social result of a speech impediment, could be prevented, say researchers.

But the public does not view speech impediments as a disability, according to a study by Marburg Univerrsity.

With its 4,000 speech therapists, West Germany is under-supplied, and, according to the Standing Conference of Ministers of Education, 80 per cent of sufferers receive no proper treatment.

Some 1,000 therapists recently attended a congress of the German Society for Speech Therapy to discuss new methods.

The meeting centred around the therapeutic function of the family. As speech expert Otto Friedrich von Hindenburg put it, frequently the family environment makes a person ill.

Often a child suffering from a speech impediment becomes a scapegoat, leading to pent up aggressions which can be directed at others or inwardly. *Reuter*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 October 1978)

Violence without ideals

Continued from page 12

trated" and "broken desperadoes." "They are thrown back upon themselves, meaning that they have only the alternative of resorting to drugs, alcohol, psychotherapy or attempting to find a personal identity through the urban guerrilla movement."

Curiously, the public sees the terrorists as they would like to be seen: as a gang of cold and calculating criminals, stopping at nothing — not even their own death.

But behind the facade we find little left of this strength and energy. They are clever, brutal and ruthless. But they are no giants.

Their *weltanschauung* is in keeping with the snivelling attitude which, much to his surprise, the author and avowed communist Martin Walser met with at the Hamburg literature festival *Literatrubel*.

When Walser said that things were much worse a few thousand, a few hundred or even 40 years ago, the youthful audience protested vehemently. And when he named the Inquisition, witchhunts and bloodbaths as examples, the audience laughed derisively, shouting: "What is all this compared with the Extremists Act?" They simply refused to face the fact that youth was worse off in the past.

But it is not only the great dissatisfaction with the state of our world that motivates terrorists.

Some of them whose past history is known demonstrate that personal tragedies (or what they consider tragedies) were instrumental in their embarking on a career of violence.

In some instances this was triggered by everyday experience, shrugged off by more robust personalities.

Baumann put it this way: "Those characters were warped anyway, and I can see with myself now that the whole thing amounts to running away from love into absolute violence."

In love with themselves and their ideas, which have little to do with reality, terrorists cultivate the heroic gesture, all the way to suicide as a revolutionary signal.

They talk themselves into believing that the destiny of man depends on their unselfish action, endowing that from which they suffer with a higher meaning, caring little that they make others suffer. Therein lies their failure as human beings — more so than in their criminal actions.

Thornton Wilder once said: "The pity about do-gooders is that they do not begin with themselves."

Wolfgang Wagner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 October 1978)

■ SPORT

Blind sportsmen enjoy taking hard knocks

Rollerball is a kind of soccer for the blind and in the gym you can hear a pin drop. Silence is vital, or players would not be able to hear the two-kilo medicine ball with a built-in bell.

The game is played by two teams of three: two backs defending a six-metre goal-line and a goal-scoring forward.

They wear as much padding as ice hockey players. Rollerball may be slower but the players take knocks and get bruises, often heading the ball out of harm's way from point-blank distances.

It is not a sport for the faint-hearted. Sighted spectators hage been known to leave the gym early looking pale, horrified by the seeming brutality.

National championships were held in Duisburg on 21 October, and one of the competitors was Hermann-Josef Kurzen, 22, from Dortmund.

He is one of 76 members of a Dortmund sports club for the blind, the only one of its kind in the country.

Some members were blind from birth (an overdose of oxygen in the incubator incapacitates the retina). Others lost their sight in accidents. Club membership increases by the day.

Conversation with them is lively. They are full of fun, extremely critical and absolutely uninhibited. They can see neither the shorthand notebook nor the tape recorder.

Kurzen was blind in one eye from an early age but could see well with the other until a game of football three years ago.

He was wearing his reading glasses and was hit full in the face by a soccer ball. A few days later he began to lose the sight in his one good eye. There was nothing doctors could do. Before long he was blind.

He may be blind but he is as keen on sport as ever. His living-room at home looks like a broadcasting studio, full of radios and tape decks.

Many blind people are radio hams, a hobby well suited to their disability. Hearing has to stand substitute for vision.

Sound is what they go by, both on the street and in sport. In the 100 metres they are out of the starting-blocks as fast as anyone else, then the difference starts.

They run by ear, as it were, yet somehow manage to keep to their lanes with uncanny accuracy. They home in on aides with megaphones at the finishing-tape.

It is an ability that has to be learnt. Kurzen recalls that on his first attempt he ran straight into a group of spectators.

But the blind clearly benefit enormously from acquiring skills of direction-finding and maintaining equilibrium. What they learn from sport is extremely useful in everyday life.

Yet only five per cent or so of the 70,000 blind people in the Federal Republic of Germany go in for sport. In sports clubs for the handicapped they feel outsiders, and there is little they can do in clubs for the general public.

It is a sorry tale. Sport is even neglected at schools for the blind.

So how can one help? The blind are handicapped but not ill. They need someone to take them to the jetty but they are quite capable of rowing for themselves. They can also ride horses or jump on trampolines. It is amazing to see them performing forward and backward somersaults with consummate ease. Swimming and judo are sports in which their handicap hardly matters. But people with normal vision often feel unable to take the blind seriously. The easiest way to overcome inhibitions on both sides is in a club. Kurzen takes his sport seriously and proves the point that the blind are no less ambitious than the sighted. The importance of sport for the blind is clearly underestimated.

Kurzen runs his fingertips along the lines of Braille in a newspaper for the blind. "Damn it," he says, "no sports news again."

Rolf Kunkel

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 14 October 1978)

Footpower on the Ring

Grand prix for athletes: Nürburgring race track, which usually echoes to the sound of snarling engines, is taken over by 5,300 runners pitting themselves against the 22.8km track. Of the 3,400 who qualified, 3,036 went around in under 2hrs 20 min. Winner was Hans-Jürgen Ortmann in 1:16:08. (Photo: Sven Simon)



No sport for the faint-hearted: Blind rollerball players get ready to contest a throw-in in the testing sport. (Photo: Schlesiger)

Sports Foundation starts its run-up for Moscow

The Sports Aid Foundation, set up to channel donations towards top-flight amateur sport in preparation for the 1972 Munich Olympics by Frankfurt mail-order magnate and Olympic equestrian gold medallist Josef Neckermann, has not been in the news much recently.

But it is still helping athletes and in a year that has been hearteningly successful for many sports in West Germany, Herr Neckermann delivered an annual report with an eye to the 1980 Olympics.

At a press conference in Frankfurt's Plaza Hotel he listed 157 athletes receiving financial backing from the Sports Aid Foundation who won gold, silver or bronze at world or European championships so far this year.

The foundation has been going for 11 years, during which time 8,150 athletes have benefited from grants totalling about DM70m.

Field and track athletes have taken the largest share, DM7.6m, followed by swimmers, with about DM6m, and oarsmen, with about DM4m.

Athletes now receiving financial assistance number 2,061. Field and track athletes have benefited from grants to talling about DM70m.

Special importance is attached to helping promising youngsters: 1,148 members of what is called the C squad. A new award scheme has been launched to encourage them.

At a 14 November meeting of the foundation's board of governors, a Junior Sportsman of the Year will be crowned. Winners will take home a useful grant.

First prize will be worth DM12,000 and runners-up will get DM6,000 and DM3,000 in cash. Herr Neckermann says he is having no difficulty in finding donors for the award scheme.

This is more than can be said for the work of the foundation as a whole. Sales of special postage stamps with a charity surcharge earn most money, as always.

Postage stamp revenue has netted DM5m since last April alone. But more money is needed to prepare for the Moscow Olympics.

This year the foundation has made do with a budget of DM8m. Next year and in 1980 DM12m will be needed.

There is lottery revenue and several hundred thousand deutschemarks a year from sales of plastic bags by a department store chain.

Yet another couple of cheery little cartoon figures, Sportbilly and Sportsusy, will also raise funds, however boring the prospect may sound.

Donations from the public are also welcome. Only recently an old-age pensioner sent the foundation bonds worth DM4,000 to help sporting amateurs compete internationally.

Harald Pieper

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 October 1978)